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The	  development	  of	  modern	  corporate	   law	  can	  be	   located	   in	   four	  “origin”	   legal	  systems:	  
France,	  England,	  Germany	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (specifically	  in	  leading	  State	  Jurisdictions	  
such	   as	   New	   York,	   New	   Jersey	   and	   Delaware).	   These	   systems	   are	   often	   segregated	  
between	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  “outsider”	  system	  of	  corporate	   law	  and	  governance	  and	  the	  
Continental	   “insider”	   system.1	   This	   has	   its	   political	   economy	   parallel	   in	   the	   “Varieties	   of	  
Capitalism”	  literature,	  which	  separates	  the	  major	  capitalist	  economies	  into	  “Liberal	  Market	  
Economies”,	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  USA,	  and	  “Co-­‐ordinated	  Market	  Economies”,	  such	  as	  
Germany.2	   These	   distinctions	   concentrate,	   in	   particular,	   on	   whether	   the	   system	   of	  
corporate	   finance	   is	   based	   on	   open	   stock	   markets	   and	   widely	   dispersed	   “outsider”	  
shareholding,	   as	   in	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   model,	   or	   on	   finance	   carried	   out	   by	   “insider”	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1	   See	   also	   ALAN	   DIGNAM	   &	   MICHAEL	   GALANIS,	   THE	   GLOBALIZATION	   OF	   CORPORATE	   GOVERNANCE	   43-­‐45	   (2010);	   Henry	  
Hansmann	  &	  Reiner	  Kraakman,	  The	  End	  of	  History	  of	  Corporate	  Law,	  in	  CONVERGENCE	  AND	  PERSISTENCE	  IN	  CORPORATE	  
GOVERNANCE	  33	  (Jeffrey	  Gordon	  &	  Mark	  Roe	  eds.,	  2004),	  also	  published	  in	  89	  GEORGETOWN	  UNIV.	  L.R.	  439	  (2001).	  	  
2	  See	  VARIETIES	  OF	  CAPITALISM:	  THE	  INSTITUTIONAL	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  COMPARATIVE	  ADVANTAGE	  (Peter	  Hall	  &	  David	  Soskice	  
eds.,	   2001).	   For	   a	   critical	   appraisal	   of	   this	   approach,	   see	   Gregory	   Jackson	   &	   Richard	   Deeg,	   From	   Comparing	  
Capitalisms	  to	  the	  Politics	  of	  Institutional	  Change,	  15(4)	  REV.	  OF	  INT’L	  POL.	  ECON.	  680	  (2008).	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universal	   investment	   banks	   with	   places	   on	   the	   supervisory	   organs	   of	   corporations	   as	   is	  
often	  claimed	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  the	  German	  system.3	  	  
	  
In	  more	   recent	   times	   Anglo-­‐American	   corporate	   law	   has	   been	   seen	   as	   an	   expression	   of	  
economic	  liberalism,	  focused	  on	  the	  maximization	  of	  shareholder	  value,	  given	  its	  emphasis	  
on	  shareholder	  protection	  in	  response	  to	  the	  management	  agency	  problem.4	  By	  contrast,	  
Continental	  jurisdictions	  are	  said	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  stakeholder	  value	  and	  so	  have	  been	  less	  
successful	   in	  adapting	  to	  the	  new	  liberal	  global	  order,	   leading	  to	  a	  more	  recent	  apparent	  
convergence	   with	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   model.5	   Such	   crude	   classifications	   along	   ‘legal	  
family’	   lines	  have	  been	  criticized	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   there	   is	   little	   correlation	  between	   the	  
type	   of	   legal	   system,	   the	   nature	   of	   its	   corporate	   law	   system	   and	   levels	   of	   investor	  
protection.6	  Nor	  is	  finance	  through	  stock	  markets	  and	  by	  universal	  investment	  banks	  a	  set	  
of	  alternatives	  that	  indelibly	  control	  the	  nature	  of	  corporate	  law	  and	  governance.	  As	  will	  be	  
shown	  below,	   in	  the	  German	  case,	  both	  systems	  have	  run	  in	  parallel,	  except	  towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  Nazi	  period	  and	  the	  revival	  of	  stock	  markets	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  their	  impact	  
on	   corporate	   law	   is	   far	   more	   difficult	   to	   determine	   than	   the	   simple	   dichotomy	   of	  
“outsider/insider”	  would	  suggest.	  	  
	  
                                            
3	   In	  France,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  State	  as	  financier	   is	  emphasised.	  See	  also	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  46-­‐48;	  
Hansmann	  &	  Kraakman,	  supra	  note	  1.	  
4	   For	   the	  proposition	   that	   the	  common	   law	  countries	  are	  more	  suited	   to	   the	  development	  of	   financial	  markets	  
because	   they	   offer,	   on	   average,	   better	   creditor	   rights,	   shareholder	   rights,	   and	   private	   property	   rights	   than	  
countries	   following	  a	  civil	   law	  tradition,	   see	  Rafael	  La	  Porta,	  Florencio	  Lopez	  de	  Silanes,	  Adrei	  Shleifer	  &	  Robert	  
Vishny,	   Legal	   Determinants	   of	   External	   Finance,	   LII	   J.	   OF	   FIN.	   1131	   (1997);	   Rafael	   La	   Porta,	   Florencio	   Lopez	   de	  
Silanes,	  Adrei	   Shleifer	  &	  Robert	  Vishny,	  Law	  and	  Finance,	   106	   J.	   OF	  POL.	   ECON.	  1113	   (1998);	   Thorsten	  Beck,	  Asli	  
Demirgüç-­‐Kunt	  &	  Ross	  Levine,	  Law	  and	  Finance:	  Why	  Does	  Legal	  Origin	  Matter?,	   (National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  
Research	   Working	   Paper	   No.	   9379,	   2002),	   available	   at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9379	   (last	   accessed:	   1	  
February	  2013).	  
5	  See	  La	  Porta	  et.	  al.,	  supra	  note	  4;	  Hansmann	  &	  Kraakman,	  supra	  note	  1;	  see	  also	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  
Ch.	   8,	   discussing	   how	   contemporary	   German	   corporate	   law	   is	   possibly	   converging	   towards	   the	   “outsider”	  
approach.	  
6	  See	  Katerina	  Pistor,	  Yoram	  Keinan,	  Jan	  Kleinheisterkramp	  &	  Mark	  West,	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Corporate	  Law:	  A	  Cross-­‐
Country	   Comparison,	   23	  U.	   PA.	   J.	   INT’L.	   ECON.	   L.	   791	   (2002).	   For	   a	   critique	  of	   the	   ‘legal	   families’	   approach	  of	   La	  
Porta,	   see	   Mathias	   Siems,	   Legal	   Origins:	   Reconciling	   Law	   &	   Finance	   and	   Comparative	   Law,	   52	  MCGILL	   L.	   J.	   55	  
(2007).	   For	   a	   critique	   specifically	   dealing	   with	   Germany,	   and	   rejecting	   the	   idea	   that	   Germany	   offers	   weaker	  
protection,	  see	  Udo	  Braendle,	  Shareholder	  Protection	  in	  the	  USA	  and	  Germany	  -­‐	  On	  the	  Fallacy	  of	  LLSV	  (German	  
Working	   Papers	   in	   Law	   and	   Economics	   Paper	   No.	   18,	   2006),	   available	   at:	  
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art18/	  (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	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  The	  Development	  of	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  Until	  1990	  
It	  is	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  to	  re-­‐appraise	  our	  historical	  understanding	  of	  corporate	  law	  
in	   Germany.	   This	   is	   required,	   in	   part,	   because	   very	   little	   has	   been	   written	   in	   English	   in	  
recent	   years	   on	   this	   issue.7	   The	   history	   of	   German	   corporate	   law	   lives	   mainly	   in	   the	  
German	   language.	  Given	  the	  pre-­‐eminence	  of	  Germany	  as	  a	  major	  European	  power,	  as	  a	  
formative	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  EU	  corporate	  law	  and,	  in	  historical	  terms,	  as	  a	  
major	   contributor	   to	   the	  development	  of	  Western	   legal	   scholarship,8	   it	   behooves	  Anglo-­‐
American	  scholars	  to	  become	  better	  acquainted	  with	  this	  field.	   Indeed,	  the	  global	  spread	  
of	   corporate	   law,	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   multinational	   enterprises	   operating	   in	   numerous	   local	  
corporate	  law	  systems,	  has	  transformed	  its	  study	  from	  a	  local,	  jurisdiction-­‐based	  subject	  to	  
a	  comparative	  subject,	  where	  knowledge	  of	  other	  corporate	   law	  systems	  is	  essential	  to	  a	  
proper	   understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   contemporary	   corporate	   governance	   and	  
regulation.	  	  
	  
The	  subject	  is	  faced	  with	  difficulties	  arising	  from	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  well	  developed	  comparative,	  
historical	  and	  interdisciplinary	  perspective.9	  Most	  English	  language	  scholarship	  on	  German	  
corporate	  law	  focuses	  on	  contemporary	  law	  and	  pays	  scant	  attention	  to	  German	  economic	  
and	  social	  history,	  no	  doubt	  because	  that	  is	  not	  the	  mission	  of	  these	  works.10	  As	  a	  result,	  
our	  view	  of	  German	  corporate	  law	  is	  missing	  a	  sense	  of	  its	  complex	  origins	  and	  evolution,	  
which	  can	   lead	   to	   inaccurate	   stereotyping	  of	  a	  kind	   that	  allows	   for	   crude	  generalizations	  
such	   as	   those	   found	   in	   the	   ‘legal	   family’	   debate	   on	   corporate	   law.11	   Indeed	   German	  
                                            
7	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis,	  see	  ADALBERT	  BE	  ALA	  LEVY,	  PRIVATE	  CORPORATIONS	  AND	  THEIR	  CONTROL,	  Vol.	  I,	  Chapter	  I,	  sections	  
12,	  15,	  21	  and	  23	  (1950);	  for	  a	  recent,	  very	  brief,	  summary,	  see	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  263-­‐267.	  	  
8	  On	  which,	  see	  Ugo	  Mattei,	  Why	  the	  Wind	  Changed:	   Intellectual	  Leadership	   in	  Western	  Law,	  42	  AM.	  J.	  COMP.	  L.	  
195	  (1994);	  Ron	  Harris,	  The	  Transplantation	  of	  Legal	  Discourse	  on	  Corporate	  Personality	  Theories:	  From	  German	  
Codification	  to	  British	  Political	  Pluralism	  and	  American	  Big	  Business,	  63	  WASH.	  &	  LEE	  L.	  REV.	  1422	  (2006);	  KONRAD	  
ZWEIGERT	  &	  HEIN	  KOTZ,	  AN	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  COMPARATIVE	  LAW	  154-­‐156	  (1998).	  	  
9	  On	  the	  problems	  of	  the	  history	  of	  corporate	  governance,	  and	  the	  dangers	  of	  crude,	  a-­‐historical,	  classifications,	  
see	   Gary	   Herrigel,	   Guest	   Editor’s	   Introduction:	   A	   New	   Wave	   in	   the	   History	   of	   Corporate	   Governance,	   8(3)	  
ENTERPRISE	   AND	   SOC.	   475	   (2007);	   and	   Corporate	   Governance,	   in	   THE	   OXFORD	   HANDBOOK	   OF	   BUSINESS	   HISTORY	   470	  
(Geoffrey	   Jones	   &	   Jonathan	   Zeitlin	   eds.,	   2009).	   There	   is	   also	   a	   wider	   problem	   in	   the	   apparent	   assumption	   of	  
similarity,	   if	   not	   sameness,	   in	   the	   law	   and	   its	   underpinnings:	   see	   Nicholas	   Foster,	   Company	   Law	   Theory	   in	  
Comparative	  Perspective:	  England	  and	  France,	  48	  AMER.	  J.	  OF	  COM.	  L.	  573	  (2000).	  
10	   See	   e.g.,	  MADS	   ANDENAS	   &	   FRANK	  WOOLDRIDGE,	   EUROPEAN	   COMPARATIVE	   CORPORATE	   LAW	   (2009);	   ANDREAS	   CAHN	  &	  
DAVID	  DONALD,	  COMPARATIVE	  COMPANY	  LAW:	  TEXT	  AND	  CASES	  ON	  THE	  LAWS	  GOVERNING	  CORPORATIONS	  IN	  GERMANY,	  THE	  UK	  
AND	   THE	   USA	   (2010);	   JEAN	   DU	   PLESSIS,	   BERNHARD	   GROSSFELD,	   CLAUS	   LUTTERMANN,	   INGO	   SAENGER,	   OTTO	   SANDROCK	   &	  
MATTHIAS	  CASPER,	  GERMAN	  CORPORATE	  GOVERNANCE	  IN	  AN	  INTERNATIONAL	  AND	  EUROPEAN	  CONTEXT	  (2nd	  ed.,	  2012).	  
11	   This	   can	   be	   contrasted	  with	   the	   existing	   interdisciplinary	   literature	   on	   the	   historical	   development	   of	   English	  
company	  law;	  see	  e.g.,	  RON	  HARRIS,	  INDUSTRIALISING	  ENGLISH	  LAW:	  ENTREPRENEURSHIP	  AND	  BUSINESS	  ORGANISATION	  1720-­‐
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corporate	  law	  has	  been	  used	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  ‘otherness’	  of	  German	  industrial	  and	  
corporate	  governance	  in	  ways	  which	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  paper	  seek	  to	  question.	  As	  will	  be	  
shown,	   there	   is	   far	   more	   historical	   similarity	   between	   the	   development	   of	   the	   German	  
corporate	   law	   system	  and	  other	   systems,	   including	   its	  Anglo-­‐American	   counterpart,	   than	  
the	  crude	  dichotomies	  mentioned	  above	  would	  suggest.	  	  	  
	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  see	  how	  the	  formation	  of	  corporate	  law	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  is	  
a	  part	  of	   a	   larger	  European	  exercise	   in	   legal,	   political,	   social	   and	  economic	   thought.	   This	  
was	  a	  process	  of	  cross-­‐national	  thinking,	  one	  in	  which	  comparative	  law	  methodology	  was	  
central	  and	  one	  in	  which	  the	  influence	  of	  economic	  liberalism	  was	  on	  the	  rise.12	  It	  is	  only	  in	  
the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  war	  capitalism,	  economic	  and	  
political	   crises	  and	   to	   the	  Nazi	   seizure	  of	  power	   in	  1933	   (Machtergreifung),	   that	  German	  
practice	  deviates	  significantly	  from	  other	  capitalist	  systems	  to	  create	  a	  divergent	  corporate	  
law	  system.	  The	  post	  World	  War	  II	  reconstruction	  of	  German	  corporate	  law	  develops	  again	  
in	  a	  more	  internationalised	  context	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Allied	  Occupation,	  the	  revitalisation	  of	  
liberal	   ideas	   and	   the	  desire	   of	  West	  Germany	   to	   re-­‐integrate	   into	   the	  Western	   capitalist	  
system,	  though	  by	  then	  certain	  elements	  of	  German	  corporate	  law,	  especially	  the	  two-­‐tier	  
board	   structure	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   co-­‐determination,	   made	   convergent	   change	  
difficult.	   The	   German	   Democratic	   Republic	   is	   outside	   this	   narrative	   from	   1945	   to	   1990	  
having	  become	  part	  of	  the	  Eastern	  Bloc	  and	  having	  adopted	  the	  Soviet	  system	  of	  industrial	  
and	   legal	   organisation.	   It	   returns	   to	   the	   narrative	   in	   1990,	   the	   time	   of	   German	  
Reunification	  and	  the	  end	  point	  of	  the	  present	  analysis.	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  is	  divided	  into	  chronological	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  will	  briefly	  introduce	  the	  
common	   European	   origins	   of	   German	   ideas	   on	   corporate	   law	   and	  will	   describe	   the	   first	  
forms	  of	  corporate	  law	  in	  Germany	  up	  to	  the	  time	  of	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  first	  all	  German	  
Corporation	  Law	  (Aktienrecht)	  of	  1870.	  The	  second	  section,	  the	  key	  section,	  will	  cover	  the	  
emergence	  of	  modern	  German	  corporate	  law	  from	  the	  1870	  Law	  to	  the	  1896	  Stock	  Market	  
Law	   (Börsengesetz)	  and	   the	  codification	  of	  German	  commercial	  and	  corporate	   law	   in	   the	  
Commercial	   Code	   of	   1897	   (Handelsgesetzbuch,	   HGB).	   The	   third	   section	   will	   cover	   the	  
                                                                                                                
1844	  (2000);	  ROB	  MCQUEEN,	  A	  SOCIAL	  HISTORY	  OF	  COMPANY	  LAW:	  GREAT	  BRITAIN	  AND	  THE	  AUSTRALIAN	  COLONIES	  1854-­‐1920	  
(2009).	  One	  interdisciplinary	  work	  in	  German	  covers	  the	  period	  1945-­‐1990,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  centred	  on	  corporate	  law	  
alone:	   see	   KNUT	   WOLFGANG	   NÖRR,	   DIE	   REPUBLIK	   DER	   WIRTSCHAFT.	   RECHT,	   WIRTSCHAFT	   UND	   STAAT	   IN	   DER	   GESCHICHTE	  
WESTDEUTSCHLANDS.	  TEIL	  1	  VON	  DER	  BESATZUNGSZEIT	  BIS	  ZUR	  GROßEN	  KOALITION	  (The	  republic	  of	  the	  economy;	  the	  legal	  
and	   economic	   state	   in	  West	  Germany:	   Part	   1,	   2007);	   KNUT	  WOLFGANG	  NÖRR,	  DIE	   REPUBLIK	   DER	  WIRTSCHAFT.	   RECHT,	  
WIRTSCHAFT	   UND	   STAAT	   IN	   DER	   GESCHICHTE	   WESTDEUTSCHLANDS.	   TEIL	   2	   VON	   DER	   SOZIALLIBERALEN	   KOALITION	   BIS	   ZUR	  
WIEDERVEREINIGUNG	  (The	  republic	  of	  the	  economy;	  the	  legal	  and	  economic	  state	  in	  West	  Germany:	  Part	  2,	  2007).	  	  	  
12	  See	   further,	  HELMUT	  COING,	   EUROPAISCHES	   PRIVATRECHT	  BAND	   II,	   19.	   JAHRHUNDERT	   145-­‐147	   (European	  Private	   Law,	  
Volume	   II:	   19th	   Century,	   1989);	   BERNHARD	   GROSSFELD,	   AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT,	   UNTERNEHMENSKONZENTRATION	   UND	  
KLEINAKTIONÄR	  132	  (Corporation,	  Corporate	  Concerntration	  and	  Minority	  Shareholders,	  1968).	  	  
2013]	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developments	  from	  1897	  up	  to	  1945	  that	  shift	  German	  corporate	  law	  away	  from	  a	  liberal	  
capitalist	  model.	  The	  fourth	  section	  will	  cover	  post-­‐1945	  reconstruction,	  centering	  on	  the	  
1965	   Stock	   Corporations	   Law	   (Aktiengesetz),	   the	   development	   of	   the	   co-­‐determination	  
system	   of	   worker	   participation	   in	   corporate	   governance	   and	   the	   legal	   impact	   of	  
Reunification	  on	  East	  German	  enterprises.	  Finally,	  by	  way	  of	  conclusion,	   the	  challenge	  of	  
globalization	   to	   the	   model	   of	   German	   corporate	   law	   will	   be	   discussed	   in	   the	   light	   of	  
historical	  knowledge	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  comparative	  corporate	  law.	  	  
	  
	  
B.	  The	  Foundations	  of	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  	  
	  
Germany	   has	   only	   been	   a	   unified	   State	   since	   1870.13	   Accordingly,	   prior	   to	   calls	   for	   a	  
harmonization	   and	   codification	   of	   German	   laws	   as	   a	   means	   of	   paving	   the	   way	   towards	  
German	   Unification,14	   only	   particular	   practices	   and	   local	   laws	   can	   be	   found.	   German	  
scholars	   have	   traditionally	   discussed	   the	   development	   of	   German	   corporate	   law	   by	  
focusing	   on	   the	   French	   Code	   de	   Commerce	   of	   1807,	  which	   is	   identified	   as	   the	   first	   true	  
general	   corporate	   law,	   allowing	   for	   incorporation	   by	   way	   of	   a	   more	   normative	   and	  
permissive	   system	   of	   concession	   by	   the	   state	   and	   with	   limited	   liability.15	   The	   historical	  
account	  concentrates	  on	  the	  use	  of	  the	  French	  and	  other	  comparative	   law	  precedents	  as	  
the	  basis	  for	  the	  first	  German	  corporate	  laws	  of	  the	  early	  to	  mid	  19th	  century.16	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  19th	  century,	  in	  the	  medieval	  and	  early	  modern	  period,	  German	  traders	  relied	  
on	   forms	   of	   business	   association	   that	   evolved	   out	   of	   Roman	   precedents,	   such	   as	   the	  
                                            
13	  In	  1866,	  the	  year	  when	  Bismarck	  embarked	  on	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  German	  unification	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  Austria	  
by	  Prussia,	  there	  were	  38	  German	  States:	  see	  DAVID	  THOMSON,	  EUROPE	  SINCE	  NAPOLEON	  307-­‐320	  (rev.	  ed.,	  1966).	  	  	  
14	   On	   which,	   see	   further	   HANS	   SCHLOSSER,	   GRUNDZUGE	   DER	   NEUREN	   PRIVATRACHTSGESCHICHTE	   (Outline	   of	   the	   recent	  
history	  of	  private	   law,	  9th	  ed.,	   2001),	   in	  particular,	  Chapter	  7,	  Die	  Kodifikation	  des	  Privatrechts	   in	  Deutschland	  
(the	  codification	  of	  private	  law	  in	  Germany);	  see	  also	  ZWEIGERT	  &	  KOTZ,	  supra	  note	  8,	  at	  141-­‐154.	  
15	  The	  classic	  exposition	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  the	  influential	  work	  by	  KARL	  LEHMANN,	  DIE	  GESCHICHTLICHE	  ENTWIKLUNG	  DES	  
AKTIENRECHTS	   BIS	   ZUM	   CODE	   DE	   COMMERCE	   (he	   Historical	   Development	   of	   Corporate	   Law	   up	   to	   the	   Code	   de	  
Commerce,	  1895).	  	  
16	  See	  e.g.,	   KARL	   LEHMANN,	  DAS	  RECHT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	  BAND	   I	  75-­‐82	   (The	   law	  of	   joint	   stock	   corporations,	  
1898).	  Norbert	  Reich	  also	   identifies	  the	  origins	  of	  German	  corporate	   law	  as	  beginning	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  
Code	   de	   Commerce	   and	   its	   reception	   into	   various	   German	   State	   laws:	   Norbert	   Reich,	   Die	   Entwicklung	   des	  
Deutschen	  Aktienrechts	  im	  Neunzehnten	  Jahrhundert	  (The	  development	  of	  the	  German	  Stock	  Corporation	  Law	  in	  
the	  Nineteenth	  Century),	   IUS	  COMMUNE	   II	   (1969),	  available	  at:	  http://data.rg.mpg.de/iuscommune/ic02_reich.pdf 
(last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  See	  also	  COING,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  99.	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societas	   and	   commenda,17	   and	   which	   were	   essentially	   personal	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   their	  
obligations.18	   In	  Germany	  the	  commenda	  was	  known	  as	   the	  “Sendegesellschaft”	  and	   it	   is	  
from	   these	   roots	   that	   the	   “Offene	   Handelsgesellschaft”	   developed	   with	   its	   participants	  
holding	   joint	   and	   several	   liability	   (Gesamthand).19	   Family	   partnerships	   were	   also	   used,	  
creating	  major	  trading	  houses	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Fugger,	  Welser	  and	  Imhoff,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
renewable	  short-­‐term	  contracts.20	  Also	  of	  significance	  were	  the	  early	  shipping	  partnerships	  
or	  “Reedereien”	  some	  of	  which	  lasted	  into	  the	  19th	  century.21	  	  
	  
The	   first	   German	   corporate	   entities	   appear	   around	   the	   end	   of	   the	   15th	   century	   in	   the	  
mining	  and	  metals	  industry	  (Gewerkschaften),	  characterized	  by	  capital	  divided	  into	  shares	  
and	   the	   differentiation	   of	   company	   assets	   from	   those	   of	   the	   shareholders.22	   In	   the	   17th	  
century,	  the	  Netherlands,	  England	  and	  France	  pioneered	  the	  chartered	  trading	  companies,	  
based	  on	  their	  own	  unique	   legal	   instrument,	  the	  charter	  or	  Octroi,	  which	  was	  granted	  by	  
the	  state	  covering	  the	  public	   law	  and	  private	   law	  aspects	  of	   the	  company’s	  operations.23	  
                                            
17	  Levy	  defines	  the	  societas	  as	  an	  association	   in	  which,	  “all	   the	  parties	  share	  the	  risks	  both	  as	  capitalists	  and	  as	  
traders”	  while	  the	  commenda	  is	  an	  association	  in	  which,	  “one	  party	  alone	  undertakes	  the	  management	  and	  bears	  
the	  commercial	  risk”:	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  3.	  Levy	  attributes	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  medieval	  commenda	  to	  Italy	  where	  
one	  party	  the	  tractator	  undertook	  the	  management	  of	  the	  venture,	  the	  purchase,	  transport	  and	  sale	  of	  the	  goods	  
and	  was	  responsible	  to	  creditors,	  while	  the	  other	  partner,	  the	  commendator,	  provided	  the	  capital	  but	  undertook	  
no	  further	  obligations	  or	  liability:	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  8.	  See	  also,	  LEHMANN,	  DAS	  RECHT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,	  
supra	  note	  16,	  at	  26-­‐28.	  	  
18	   See	  UWE	  WESEL,	  GESCHICHTE	  DES	  RECHTS:	  VON	  DEN	  FRUHFORMEN	  BIS	   ZUR	  GEGENWART	  394	   (History	  of	   the	  Law:	  From	  
Early	  Forms	  to	  the	  Present,	  3rd	  ed.,	  2006),	  who	  writes	  that	  in	  the	  years	  between	  the	  Middle	  Ages	  and	  the	  French	  
Revolution	  business	  associations	  were	  dominated	  by	  “Personengesellchaften	  des	  Mittelalters.”	  See	  also	  LEHMANN,	  
DAS	  RECHT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  20-­‐21.	  
19	  WESEL,	  supra	  note	  18,	  at	  336;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  9.	  
20	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  11.	  Another	  example	  is	  the	  Ravensburg	  Company,	  which	  lasted	  from	  1380	  to	  1530	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  renewable	  contracts:	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7;	  WESEL,	  supra	  note	  18,	  at	  336.	  	  	  
21	  LEHMANN,	  DAS	  RECHT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  28-­‐29,	  discussing	  the	  Mediterranean	  origins	  of	  
this	  type	  of	  business	  association;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  97.	  
22	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  11-­‐12.	  
23	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  115-­‐116;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  17-­‐30;	  and	  generally,	  see	  STEPHEN	  BROWN,	  MERCHANT	  
KINGS:	  WHEN	  COMPANIES	  RULED	  THE	  WORLD	  1600-­‐1900	  (2010).	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   345	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Development	  of	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  Until	  1990	  
Given	   the	   destruction	   wrought	   by	   the	   Reformation	   and	   the	   Thirty	   Years	   War,	   and	   the	  
absence	  of	  major	  German	  overseas	  colonies,	  there	  were	  few	  enduring	  German	  chartered	  
trading	   companies.24	   The	   most	   significant	   were	   the	   Brandenburg-­‐African	   Company	  
established	  in	  1662	  and	  the	  later	  Prussian	  Königliche	  Seehandlung	  established	  by	  the	  Royal	  
Patent	  of	  Frederick	  the	  Great	  in	  1772.25	  	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  later	  19th	  century,	  the	  system	  of	  state	   incorporation	  -­‐	  the	  Concession	  System	  
(Konzessionssystem)	  -­‐	  dominated	  the	  laws	  of	  German	  States.26	  It	  was	  justified	  by	  the	  need	  
for	  the	  state	  to	  control	  the	  corporate	  form	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  protecting	  small	  shareholders	  
and	   the	  wider	   public	   interest	   to	   control	   private	   economic	   and	  market	   power	   that	   could	  
lead	   to	   monopolization.27	   The	   Prussian	   State	   in	   particular	   adhered	   to	   this	   system.28	  
Nonetheless,	   the	   pressure	   to	   change	   towards	   a	   system	   of	   free	   incorporation	   became	  
progressively	   irresistible,	   even	   in	   Prussia.	   In	   common	   with	   other	   industrializing	   nations,	  
Germany	   faced	   the	  question	  of	   how	   to	   raise	   and	   regulate	   large	   capital	   sums	  needed	   for	  
major	   industrial	  and	   infrastructure	  projects.29	  Whether	   this	  could	  be	  done	  under	   the	  old	  
system	  of	  corporate	  charters	  was	  open	  to	  debate.30	  	  
                                            
24	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  95-­‐96;	  	  LEHMANN,	  DAS	  RECHT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  75.	  
25	   For	   a	   comparison	  of	   the	   Seehandel	  with	   the	  Dutch	   and	  English	   East	   India	  Companies,	   see	  Wilhelm	  Hartung,	  
Geschichte	  und	  Rechtsstellung	  der	  Compagnie	  in	  Europa	  Eine	  Untersuchung	  am	  Beispiel	  der	  englischen	  East-­‐India	  
Company,	  der	  niederliindischen	  Vereenigten	  Oostindischen	  Compagnie	  und	  der	  preuBischen	  Seehandlung	  (History	  
and	  Legal	  Status	  of	  the	  Company	  in	  Europe:	  A	  study	  of	  the	  English	  East	  India	  Company	  the	  Dutch	  United	  East	  India	  
Company	  and	  the	  Prussian	  Seehandlung,	  2000).	  Copy	  on	  file	  with	  author.	  
26	  According	  to	  Coing,	  the	  State	  grant	  of	  incorporation	  was	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  law	  recognised	  by	  all	  European	  
systems	   and	   was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   French	   Code	   de	   Commerce.	   See	   Helmut	   Coing,	   Rechtsvergleichung	   als	  
Grundlage	  von	  Gesetzgebung	  im	  19	  Jahrhundert	  (Law	  as	  the	  Basis	  of	  Legislation	  in	  the	  19th	  Century),	  IUS	  COMMUNE	  
VII,	  168	  (1978),	  available	  at:	  	  http://data.rg.mpg.de/iuscommune/ic07_coing.pdf	  (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013)	  
27	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  117.	   	  
28	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  97.	  For	  the	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  this	  system	  in	  Prussia,	  see	  Reich,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  
246-­‐	  247.	  On	  unease	  over	  corporations	  in	  Prussia,	  see	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  122-­‐127.	  	  	  
29	  On	  which,	  see	  Hans	  ULRICH	  WEHLER,	  DEUTSCHE	  GESELLSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	  BAND	  2	  1815-­‐1845/49,	  95-­‐107	  (History	  of	  
German	  Society,	  Volume	  2,	  4th	  ed.,	  2005).	  	  
30	  See	  COING,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  95-­‐96.	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In	  this	  regard	  the	  coming	  of	  the	  railways	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  as	  a	  spur	  to	  industrialization	  
which,	  in	  turn,	  required	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  corporate	  legal	  form	  to	  railway	  companies.31	  
Accordingly,	  the	  first	  Prussian	  law	  to	  regulate	  the	  organization	  and	  operation	  of	  companies	  
was	   the	   Law	   on	   Railway	   Companies	   (Gesetz	   über	   Eisenbahnunternehmungen)	   of	   1838.32	  
Although	   railway	   companies	   still	   had	   to	  obtain	  a	   concession	   to	   incorporate,	   this	   law	   laid	  
down	  general	  regulations	  for	  their	  operation	  and	  so	  it	  represents	  the	  first	  German	  attempt	  
to	  place	  corporate	  governance	  on	  a	  modern	  normative	  legal	  footing.33	  This	  was	  followed	  in	  
1843	  by	   the	   first	  general	   corporate	   law	   for	  Prussia	   (Preussiche	  Aktiengesetz).34	  The	  1843	  
Law	  was	  largely	  based	  on	  the	  French	  Code	  de	  Commerce	  and	  the	  Dutch	  Commercial	  Code	  
(Wetboek	  van	  Koophandel)	  of	  1838.35	  Thus,	  it	  included	  limited	  liability,	  but	  it	  only	  covered	  
joint	  stock	  companies	  and	  not	  sociétés	  en	  commandite.36	  	  
                                            
31	  See	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  96,	  614-­‐631;	  for	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  railways	  in	  German,	  US	  and	  
English	   industrialization	  between	   the	   1830s	   and	   1860s,	   see	  Rainer	   Fremdling,	  Railroads	   and	  German	  Economic	  
Growth:	  A	  Leading	  Sector	  Analysis	  with	  a	  Comparison	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain,	  37	  J.	  OF	  ECON.	  HIST.	  
583	  (1977);	  see	  also	  Reich,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  249-­‐250,	  on	  the	  connection	  between	  railway	  development	  and	  the	  
corporate	  legal	  form.	  	  
32	   GESETZ	   ÜBER	   EISENBAHNUNTERNEHMUNGEN	   (Railway	   corporate	   law)	   3.11.1838	   GS	   FUR	   DIE	   KONIGLICHEN	   PREUSSICHEN	  
STAATEN	  1838	  (GS	  for	  Royal	  Prussian	  State),	  s.	  505	  (Ger.).	  
33	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  250;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  98.	  
34	  PREUSSICHE	  AKTIENGESETZ	  (Prussian	  corporation	  law)	  9.11.1843	  GS	  FUR	  DIE	  KONGLICHEN	  PREUSSICHEN	  STAATEN	  	  1843,	  9	  
Nov.	  1843,	  Nr	  31	  s.341	  (Gr.).	  The	  following	  summary	  draws	  on	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  251;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  
98-­‐99,	  and	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  127-­‐131.	  See	  also	  GESETZ	  UBER	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	   FUR	  DIE	  KÖNIGLICH	  
PREUSSISCHEN	  STAATEN	  VON	  9	  NOVEMBER	  1843	  (Law	  on	  Companies	  for	  the	  Royal	  Prussian	  State,	  Theodor	  Baums	  ed.,	  
1981).	   Other	   German	   States	   had	   also	   adopted	   corporate	   laws	   at	   this	   time.	   Thus,	   the	   Prussian	   and	   Bavarian	  
Rhineland	  Provinces,	  Hessen	  and	  Baden,	  used	  the	  Code	  de	  Commerce	  after	  1815	  and	  only	  in	  the	  Prussian	  Rhine	  
Province	  was	  it	  supplanted	  by	  the	  1843	  law.	  	  Wurttemberg	  codified	  its	  commercial	  law	  in	  1839	  and	  followed	  the	  
Dutch	  Commercial	  Code	  in	  relation	  to	  corporations.	  Nassau	  codified	  its	  commercial	  law	  in	  1842:	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  
16,	  at	  243-­‐244;	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  104.	  	  	  
35	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  251;	  WESEL,	  supra	  note	  18,	  at	  463;	  Coing,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  169.	  	  
36	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  98-­‐99.	  The	  basic	  principle	  behind	  the	  société	  en	  commandite	  is	  that	  it	  must	  comprise	  of	  at	  
least	  two	  partners:	  the	  commandite,	  who	  is	  the	  managing	  partner	  and	  takes	  full	  liability	  for	  the	  commercial	  debts	  
of	  the	  entity,	  and	  the	  commanditaire,	  who	  is	  a	  limited	  liability	  partner	  and	  who	  takes	  no	  part	  in	  the	  management	  
of	  the	  undertaking.	  Such	  entities	  pre-­‐date	  the	  French	  Code	  de	  Commerce:	  see	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  55.	  See	  also	  
CODE	  DE	  COMMERCE,	  Art.	  L	  222-­‐1	  (Fr.).	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The	  Law	  of	  1843	  was	  a	  concession	  law	  in	  that	  the	  corporate	  statute	  had	  to	  be	  assented	  to	  
by	  the	  government.	  This	  would	  be	  given	  so	  long	  as	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  corporation	  were	  shown	  
to	  be	  in	  the	  general	  interest.37	  The	  corporate	  statute	  had	  to	  disclose	  the	  size	  of	  the	  initial	  
capital,	   the	   method	   of	   accounting	   used	   and	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   voting	   rights	   for	  
shareholders.	  The	  company	  had	  two	  organs:	   the	  Vorsteher,	   the	  main	  management	  organ	  
and	   the	   general	  meeting	   (Generalversammlung).	   Thus,	   the	   initial	  model	   for	   the	   Prussian	  
corporation	  was	   that	   of	   a	   single-­‐tier	   board.	   The	   two-­‐tier	   system	  was	   yet	   to	   evolve.	   The	  
supervisory	   board	   (Aufsichtsrat)	  was	   unknown	   to	   the	   concession	   system.38	   Prior	   to	   the	  
1843	   Law,	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   company	   was	   limited	   by	   time	   though	   this	   was	   gradually	  
increased	  from	  15	  to	  20	  to	  25	  and	  to	  99	  years.	  By	  section	  2(2)	  of	  the	  1843	  Law,	  companies	  
could	   exist	   in	   perpetuity	   but	   this	   was	   restricted	   in	   1856	   when	   it	   was	   required	   that	   the	  
corporate	   statute	   should	   state	  a	  period	  of	   corporate	  existence.39	   Initially,	   too,	   corporate	  
objectives	  had	   to	  be	   limited	   to	   those	  permitted	  by	   the	  Prussian	  Ministerial	  Decree	  of	  22	  
April	  1845.	  However,	  after	  the	  1850s,	  corporations	  with	  unspecified	  objects	  became	  more	  
numerous.40	  	  	  
	  
The	  general	  unease	  over	  the	  potential	  for	  abuse	  of	  corporate	  power	  would	  not	  last.	  Even	  
before	  the	  1843	  Law,	  the	  Hanseatic	  City	  States	  were	  applying	  a	  normative	  system	  based	  on	  
freedom	  of	   incorporation	  and,	   in	  addition	   to	   the	  Aktiengesellschaft,	   they	  used	  a	  German	  
equivalent	   of	   the	   societe	   en	   commandite	   -­‐	   the	  Kommanditgesellchaft	   auf	   Aktien.41	   They	  
argued	   for	   the	   general	   adoption	   of	   such	   a	   system	  when	   negotiations	   for	   an	   all-­‐German	  
Commercial	   Code	   began	   in	   Nuremberg	   in	   1857.42	   They	   saw	   the	   concession	   system	   as	  
arresting	   corporate	   investment	   and	   placing	   the	   state	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   corporate	  
                                            
37	  See	  also	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  253-­‐254.	  
38	   Coing,	   supra	   note	   26,	   at	   172:	   the	   Code	   de	   Commerce	   “Dementsprechend	   kannte	   es	   das	   Konzessionssystem;	  
dagegwen	  war	  die	  Institution	  des	  Aufrichtsrates	  unbekannt.”	  
39	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  128.	  	  
40	  Id.	  at	  130-­‐131.	  
41	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  245;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  101.	  	  
42	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  260;	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  134;	  Coing,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  173.	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regulation.43	  This	  was	  not	  conducive	  to	  the	  further	  industrial	  modernization	  of	  19th	  century	  
Germany.	   Nor	   was	   it	   clear	   that	   the	   concession	   system	   was	   superior	   to	   the	   normative	  
system.	   It	   was	   apparent	   that	   it	   was	   unable	   to	   protect	   shareholders	   or	   creditors	   against	  
abuse.44	   Hamburg	   argued	   that	   the	   best	   defence	   against	   abuse	  was	   the	   oversight	   of	   the	  
company’s	  affairs	  by	  the	  shareholders.45	  	  Nonetheless	  Prussia	  and	  the	  majority	  of	  German	  
States	   resisted	   the	   Hanseatic	   States.	   A	   compromise	   was	   reached	   in	   the	   All-­‐German	  
Commercial	   Code	   (Allgemeines	  Deutsches	  Handelsgesetzbuch,	   ADHGB)	  of	   1861,	  whereby	  
each	  German	  State	  was	  empowered	  to	  determine	  for	  itself	  whether	  it	  would	  continue	  with	  
a	   concession	   system	  or	  move	   towards	   freedom	  of	   incorporation.46	  Thus,	   the	  Nuremberg	  
Conference	   failed	   to	   resolve	   what	   type	   of	   corporate	   legal	   form	   and	   what	   type	   of	  
incorporation	  should	  found	  the	  all-­‐German	  system.	  As	  a	  result,	  different	  State	  systems	  of	  
corporate	  law	  remained.47	  	  
C.	  The	  Establishment	  of	  Modern	  Corporation	  Law,	  1870	  to	  1897	  
	  
The	  multiplicity	  of	  State	  corporation	   laws	  could	  not	   last.	  The	  unification	  of	  Germany	  and	  
the	  economic	  need	  for	  easy	  access	  to	  the	  limited	  liability	  corporate	  form	  gave	  impetus	  for	  
a	  unified	  German	  corporate	   law	  based	  on	  a	  normative	  system	  of	   free	   incorporation.	  Not	  
only	   were	   England	   and	   France	   moving	   towards	   freedom	   of	   incorporation,	   respectively	  
under	  the	  English	  Companies	  Act	  1862	  and	  the	  French	  Loi	  sur	  les	  Sociétés	  a	  Responsabilité	  
Limite	  of	  1863,	  but	  calls	   for	   the	   final	  abolition	  of	   the	  concession	  system	   in	  Germany	  had	  
become	  irresistible	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  “Freigabe	  des	  Aktienwesens.”48	  	  
	  
Equally,	   fears	   over	   the	   competitive	   impact	   of	   corporations	   began	   to	   recede	   during	   the	  
1860s.	  Most	   corporations	  were	   fairly	   small	   and	   the	   corporate	   form	  was	   seen	  as	   suitable	  
                                            
43	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  255;	  Wehler,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  105-­‐106.	  
44	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  134.	  
45	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  260.	  
46	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  134-­‐135,	  citing	  Art.	  249	  of	  the	  ADHGB:	  “Den	  Landegesetzen	  bleibt	  es	  vorbehalten	  
zu	  bestimmen,	  dass	  es	  der	  staatlichen	  Gehnemigung	  zur	  errichtung	  von	  Aktiengesellschaften	  im	  allgemienem	  oder	  
von	  einzelnen	  Arten	  derselbern	  nicht	  bedarf.”	  	  
47	  Reich,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  261-­‐262.	  
48	  See	  Reich,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  264-­‐265.	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only	  in	  certain	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  while	  the	  risk	  of	  abuse	  of	  market	  power	  could	  be	  
controlled	   by	   an	   effective	   normative	   system	   rather	   than	   by	   concessions.49	   Indeed,	  
competition	   would	   be	   enhanced	   if	   freedom	   of	   incorporation	   was	   to	   be	   available,	   as	   it	  
would	  allow	  for	  more	  business	  associations	  to	  arise.50	  	  	  
	  
In	   response	   to	   these	   influences,	   the	   North	   German	   Bund	   began	   to	   debate	   a	   new	   all-­‐
German	  corporate	  law	  in	  1870	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  proposed	  reform	  of	  the	  ADHGB.	  Once	  
again,	  Prussia	  was	   skeptical	   about	  how	   far	   freedom	  of	   incorporation	   could	  go,	  while	   the	  
Hanseatic	  Cities	  wanted	  full	  liberalization.51	  Prussia	  carried	  the	  majority	  of	  German	  States.	  
Thus,	  while	  the	  1870	  Law	  applied	  to	  both	  Kommanditgesellschaften	  auf	  Aktien	  (KGaA)	  and	  
Aktiengesellschaften	  (AG),	  and	  permitted	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  company	  by	  registration,	  
it	  contained	  numerous	  formalities	  and	  restrictions	  on	  company	  formation,52	  introduced	  a	  
prohibition	  on	  dividend	  distribution	  where	  this	  would	  weaken	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  company,	  
a	  prohibition	  on	  dealing	  in	  its	  own	  shares	  by	  the	  company,	  a	  prohibition	  on	  the	  company’s	  
supervisory	  and	  management	  board	  members	  entering	  into	  transactions	  with	  the	  company	  
                                            
49	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  136-­‐137.	  
50	  Id.	  at	  137-­‐138.	  
51	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  discussions	  leading	  to	  the	  1870	  Law,	  see	  Werner	  Schubert,	  Die	  Abschaffung	  des	  
Konzessionssystems	   durch	   die	   Aktienrechtnovelle	   von	   1870	   (The	   abolition	   of	   the	   concession	   system	   by	   the	  
Company	   Law	   Amendment	   of	   1870),	   10	   ZEITSCHRIFT	   FÜR	   UNTERNEHMENS-­‐	   UND	   GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT	   2,	   285	   (1981),	  
available	   at: http://www.degruyter.com/dg/viewarticle/j$002fzgre.1981.10.issue-­‐
2$002fzgre.1981.10.2.285$002fzgre.1981.10.2.285.xml;jsessionid=5ECE5F7390DE5D53017F5B595FDA4F2F	   (last	  
accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  For	  a	  more	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  codification	  process,	  see	  Klaus	  Hopt,	  Ideelle	  und	  
wirtschafliche	   Grundlagen	   der	   Aktien-­‐	   Bank-­‐	   und	   Borsen	   rechtsentwicklung	   in	   19.	   Jahrhundert,	   in	  WISSENSCHAFT	  
UNDE	  KODIFIKATION	  DES	  PRIVATRECHTS	   IM	  19.	  JAHERHUNDERTS	  128	  (The	  science	  and	  codification	  of	  private	  law,	  Helmut	  
Coing	  &	  Walter	  Wilhelm	  eds.,	  1980).	  
52	  GESETZ	  BETREFFEND	  DIE	  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	  AUF	  AKTIEN	  UND	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,	  11	  June	  1870,	  s.	  375-­‐386	  
Artikel	   (Art.)	   210a	   and	  Art.	   211:	   “Der	   Anmeldung	   Behufs	   der	   Eintragung	   in	   das	  Handelsregister	  muß	   beigefügt	  
sein:	  1)	  die	  Bescheinigung,	  dass	  der	  gesammte	  Betrag	  des	  Grundkapitals	  durch	  Unterschriften	  gedeckt	  ist;	  2)	  Die	  
Bescheinigung,	  dass	  mindestens	  zehn	  Prozent,	  bei	  Versicherungsgesellschaften	  mindestens	  zwanzig	  Prozent,	  des	  
von	  jedem	  Aktionair	  gezeichneten	  Betrages	  eingezahlt	  sind;	  3)	  der	  Nachweis,	  dass	  der	  Aufsichtsrath	  nach	  Inhalt	  
des	  Vertrages	  in	  einer	  Generalversammlung	  der	  Aktionaire	  gewählt	  ist;	  4)	  betreffenden	  Falls	  die	  gerichtliche	  oder	  
notarielle	  Urkunde	  über	  die	   in	  den	  Artikeln	  209a	  und	  209b	  bezeichneten	  Beschlüsse	  der	  Generalversammlung.	  
Die	  Anmeldung	  muß	  von	  sämmtlichen	  Mitgliedern	  des	  Vorstandes	  vor	  dem	  Handelsgericht	  unterzeichnet	  oder	  in	  
beglaubigter	   Form	   eingereicht	   werden.	   Die	   der	   Anmeldung	   beigefügten	   Schriftstücke	   werden	   bei	   dem	  
Handelsgericht	  in	  Urschrift	  oder	  in	  beglaubigter	  Abschrift	  aufbewahrt.”	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  14	  No.	  02 350	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
unless	  a	  2/3rds	  majority	  of	  the	  General	  meeting	  approved,	  and	  new	  accounting	  rules	  and	  
criminal	  penalties.53	  	  
	  
Most	   significantly,	   the	  1870	  Law	  required	   the	  use	  of	   the	  Aufsichtsrat	   (or	  Aufsichtsrath	   in	  
the	  original),	  at	  least	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  AG,	  to	  replace	  the	  State	  authorization	  and	  oversight	  
of	   the	   concession	   system.54	   The	  Aufsichtsrat	  was	   available	   as	   an	   optional	   organizational	  
device	  under	  Art.225	  of	  the	  ADHGB	  in	  relation	  to	  KGaAs,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  1870	  Law	  that	  gave	  
legal	  force	  to	  the	  two	  tier	  board	  structure.55	  However	  there	  was	  confusion	  as	  to	  whether	  
the	  Aufsichtsrat	  was	  also	  compulsory	  for	  the	  KGaA,	  and	  this	  had	  to	  be	  clarified	  by	  the	  1884	  
Law,	   which	   stated	   that	   both	   corporate	   forms	   had	   to	   have	   an	  Aufsichtsrat.56	   Again,	   the	  
1870	  Law	  was	  influenced	  by	  foreign	  developments,	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  supervisory	  organ	  was	  
taken	  from	  French	  law.57	  
	  
The	   1870	   Law	   had	   immediate	   impact.	   Following	   victory	   in	   the	   Franco-­‐Prussian	   War	   of	  
1870-­‐71,	  and	  the	  consequential	  boost	  to	  the	  German	  economy	  from	  war	  reparations	  and	  
                                            
53	  Schubert,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  302-­‐312.	  
54	  Schubert,	  supra	  note	  51,	  at	  306.	  	  	  	  
55	  ADOLF	  CAHN,	  DER	  AUFSICHTSRAT	  DER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT	  6-­‐10	  (The	  Supervisory	  Board	  of	  the	  Corporation,	  1907).	  For	  
a	  detailed	  historical	  analysis	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Aufsichtsrat	   in	  German	  law,	  see	  Tanja	  Schnorr,	  Historie	  und	  Recht	  
des	   Aufsichtsrats	   -­‐	   Deutsche	   Erfahrungen	   als	   Beitrag	   zum	   Statut	   der	   Europäischen	   Aktiengesellschaft	   1991	  
(Inaugural-­‐Dissertation	   Zur	   Erlangung	   der	   Würde	   eines	   doctor	   iuris	   der	   Juristischen	   Fakultät	   der	   Bayerischen	  
Julius-­‐Maximilians-­‐Universität	   Würzburg,	   2000),	   available	   at:	   http://ebookbrowse.com/diss-­‐tanja-­‐schnorr-­‐pdf-­‐
pdf-­‐d89249780	  or	  http://d-­‐nb.info/971589054/34	  (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  	  
56	  See	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  128;	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  267-­‐268;	  Coing,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  173.	  GESETZ	  BETREFFEND	  
DIE	  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	  AUF	  AKTIEN	  UND	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	  VOM	  18	  JULI	  1884	  [AKTIENGESETZ	  1884],	  18	  Jul.	  
1884,	  	  DEUTSCHES	  REICHSGESETZBLATT	  BAND	  1884,	  Nr	  22	  s.	  123-­‐170	  Art.	  175e	  (Ger.):	  “Jede	  Kommanditgesellschaft	  auf	  
Aktien	  muss	  einen	  Aufsichtsrath	  haben”,	  Art.	   209f:	   “Jede	  Aktiengesellschaft	  muss	   ausser	  dem	  Vorstande	  einen	  
Aufsichtsrath	  haben.”	  	  
57	  Coing,	  supra	  note	  26,	  at	  173.	  Some	  dispute	  exists	  as	  to	  how	  this	   idea	  was	  taken	  from	  French	  to	  German	   law	  
with	  the	  suggestion	  made	  by	  Passow,	  rejected	  by	  Levy,	  that	  German	  legislators	  had	  wrongly	  translated	  the	  French	  
Conseil	   de	   Surveillance	   literally	  when	   they	   only	   intended	   the	   supervisory	   organ	   to	   be	   an	   advisory	   body	   to	   the	  
management	  board	  based	  on	   the	  German	  Verwaltungsrat:	   see	   LEVY,	   supra	   note	  7,	   at	   129.	  Francks,	  Mayer	   and	  
Wagner	   accept	   Passow’s	   view:	   Julian	   Franks,	   Colin	   Mayer	   &	   Hannes	   Wagner,	   The	   Origins	   of	   the	   German	  
Corporation	   –	   Finance,	   Ownership	   and	   Control,	   10	   REV.	   OF	   FIN.	   537	   (2006).	   They	   cite	   Richard	   Passow,	   Die	  
Entstehung	   Des	   Aufsichtsrats	   der	   Aktiengesellschaft,	   64	   ZEITSCHRIFT	   FUER	   DAS	   GESAMTE	   HANDELSRECHT	   UND	  
KONKURSRECHT,	  27–57	  (1909),	  	  and	  RICHARD	  PASSOW,	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT:	  EINE	  WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFTLICHE	  STUDIE	  
(The	  Corporation:	  An	  Economic	  Study,	  2nd	  ed.,	  1922).	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German	   unification,	   a	   “Founders	   Boom”	   (Gründerboom)	   spurred	   a	   wave	   of	   new	  
incorporations	  under	   the	  new	  corporation	   law.58	  However,	  by	  1873	   the	  boom	   turned	   to	  
bust	  (the	  Founders	  Crash	  -­‐	  Gründungskrach)	  and	  much	  of	  the	  blame	  for	  the	  ensuing	  wave	  
of	  fraudulent	  corporate	  failures	  (the	  Gründerschwindel)	  was	  placed	  at	  the	  feet	  of	  the	  1870	  
Law.59	   In	   particular,	   the	   minimum	   capital	   requirement	   of	   10%	   for	   the	   formation	   of	   a	  
company	   was	   too	   low	   to	   prevent	   overvalued	   corporate	   promotions,	   the	   registration	  
process	  before	  the	  Commercial	  Court	  was	  a	  mere	  formality	  without	  proper	  oversight,	  the	  
Aufsichtsrat	   and	   the	  Generalversammlung	   were	   incapable	   of	   performing	   their	   oversight	  
duties,	  and	  numerous	  manipulations	  of	  share	  prices	  created	  a	  bubble.60	  	  
	  
In	   response,	   reform	  of	   the	   law	  of	  1870	  was	  thought	  essential.	  However,	   this	  was	  to	   take	  
until	  1884,	  given	  much	  debate	  as	  to	  the	  proper	  way	  forward.61	  According	  to	  Reich,	  at	  least	  
three	  alternative	  approaches	  were	  contesting	  the	  agenda.	  The	  first	  was	  outright	  abolition	  
of	   the	   corporate	   legal	   form,	   which	   could	   not	   survive	   Germany’s	   espousal	   of	   market	  
capitalism,	  the	  second	  was	  to	  limit	  the	  corporate	  sphere	  of	  operations,	  thereby	  effectively	  
avoiding	   a	   general	   corporation	   law,	   while	   the	   third	   retained	   the	   liberal	   commitment	   to	  
complete	   freedom	   of	   incorporation.	   This	   could	   not	   survive	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  
Gründerschwindel.	   The	   resulting	   compromise	  was	   to	   retain	  a	   general	   corporate	   law	  with	  
freedom	   of	   incorporation	   but	   with	   greater	   controls	   over	   corporate	   operations	   and	  
protection	  against	  abuses.	  	  
	  
The	  resulting	  Law	  of	  1884	  covers	  both	  the	  KGaA	  and	  the	  AG.62	  It	  focuses	  on	  the	  process	  of	  
incorporation	  and	  the	  formalities	  required,	  including	  full	  disclosure	  of	  corporate	  funds	  and	  
                                            
58	  See	  HANS-­‐ULRICH	  WEHLER,	  DEUTSCHE	  GESELLSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	  BAND	  3,	  1849-­‐1914,	  81-­‐86	  (History	  of	  German	  Society,	  
Volume	  3,	  2nd	  ed.,	  2006).	  	  
59	  See	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  268.	  
60	  Id.	   	  
61	  See	  REICH,	  supra	  note	  16,	  at	  270-­‐276,	  on	  which	  the	  following	  paragraph	  relies,	  and	  Grossfeld	  above	  n.12	  at	  144-­‐
145.	  See	  also,	  Hundert	   Jahre	  Modernes	  Aktienrecht:	  Sammlung	   	  von	  Texten	  und	  Quellen	  zur	  Aktienrechtsreform	  
1884	  (One	  Hundred	  Years	  of	  Modern	  Company	  Law:	  Collection	  of	  Texts	  and	  Sources	  on	  Corporate	  Law	  Reform,	  
Werner	  Schubert	  &	  Peter	  Hommelhoff	  eds.,	  1985).	  	  
62	  GESETZ	  BETREFFEND	  DIE	  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	  AUF	  AKTIEN	  UND	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	  VOM	  18	  JULI	  1884,	  supra	  
note	  56.	  For	  a	  brief	  summary	  in	  English,	  see	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  128-­‐131.	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details	   in	   a	   prospectus	   and	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   an	  Aufsichtsrat	   (Aufsichtsrath).63	   The	   1884	  
Law	   follows	   the	   1870	   Law	   in	   requiring	   an	   issue	   to	   be	   subscribed	   to	   a	  minimum	  of	   1000	  
marks	   and	   at	   least	   25%	   (200	  Marks)	   of	   the	   capital	   to	   be	   paid	   up	   upon	   establishment.64	  
Failure	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  formalities	  of	  accurate	  disclosure	  would	  result	   in	  the	  personal	  
liability	  of	  the	  founding	  members	  and	  supervisory	  board	  members.65	  In	  cases	  of	  knowingly	  
false	   disclosure	   criminal	   penalties	   were	   provided	   for.66	   Corporations	   had	   to	   file	   annual	  
profit,	  loss	  and	  balance	  statements.67	  Further	  protections	  included	  rules	  covering	  changes	  
in	   the	   articles	   of	   association	   and	   in	   the	   capital	   of	   the	   corporation,68	   and	   controls	   over	  
share	   transactions,	   including	   a	   prohibition	   against	   dealing	   by	   the	   corporation	   in	   its	   own	  
shares.69	  The	  1884	  Law	  guaranteed	  limited	  liability	  for	  shareholders,70	  while	  the	  personal	  
liability	   of	   supervisory	   board	  members	  would	   be	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   ordinary	  
reasonable	   businessman.71	   In	   addition,	  minority	   shareholder	   protection	   and	   shareholder	  
remedies	  were	   included.72	  Corporate	  organization	  under	  the	  1884	  Law	  requires,	  both	  for	  
the	   KGaA	   and	  AG,	   a	   general	  meeting	   (Generalsammlung)	  and	   an	  Aufsichtsrat	  elected	   by	  
                                            
63	  GESETZ	  BETREFFEND	  DIE	  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	  AUF	  AKTIEN	  UND	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	  VOM	  18	  JULI	  1884,	  supra	  
note	  56,	  for	  KGaA	  at	  Arts.	  175-­‐179,	  for	  AG	  Arts.	  207-­‐212.	  	  
64	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Art.	  173a;	  for	  AG,	  Art.	  207a.	  	  	  	  
65	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Arts.	  180-­‐180b	  and	  Art.	  193	  on	  duties	  of	  the	  supervisory	  board	  members;	  for	  AG,	  Arts.	  213-­‐213c.	  
66	  Id.,	  Arts.	  249-­‐249g.	  
67	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Arts.	  185-­‐185c;	  for	  AG,	  Art.	  239.	  	  
68	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Arts	  180f-­‐180i;	  for	  AG,	  Arts.	  215	  and	  215a.	  
69	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Arts.	  181-­‐183a,	  184-­‐184d;	  for	  AG,	  Arts.	  215b-­‐215d.	  
70	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Art.	  183b;	  for	  AG,	  Art.	  219.	  
71	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Art.	  204:	  “die	  sorgfalt	  eines	  ordentlichen	  Geschaftsmanns	  anzuweden”;	  for	  the	  AG,	  Art.	  226.	  
72	   Id.,	   for	  KGaA	  and	  AG,	  Art.	  190	   (ensuring	  that	  each	  shareholder	  has	  a	  vote	   in	   the	  General	  Meeting	  and	   larger	  
shareholders	  could	  be	  subjected	  to	  limits	  in	  voting);	  for	  AG	  shareholder	  remedies,	  see	  Arts.	  221-­‐223.	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the	  former.73	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  AG,	  the	  two-­‐tier	  structure	  requires	   full	  separation	  of	  the	  
Aufsichtsrat	  and	  the	  management	  board	  (Vorstand).74	  	  
	  
The	  principal	  provisions	  of	  the	  1884	  Law	  were	  codified	  into	  the	  HGB	  of	  1897.75	  This	  made	  a	  
number	   of	   changes,	   including	   the	   strengthening	   of	   control	   over	   incorporation	   and	  
increases	   and	   decreases	   in	   the	   capital	   of	   the	   corporation,	   new	   rules	   permitting	   the	  
inclusion	   of	   rules	   on	   recurrent	   contributions	   in	   goods	   in	   the	   articles	   of	   association	   and	  
increased	  rights	  for	  minority	  shareholders,	  who	  could	  now	  bring	  an	  action	  against	  persons	  
liable	  to	  the	  corporation	  based	  on	  10%	  of	  the	  share	  capital	  instead	  of	  20%.76	  	  	  
	  
The	  two	  tier	  structure	  of	  the	  post-­‐1870	  German	  corporation	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  recent	  
historical	  debate.	  In	  particular,	  two	  connected	  issues	  stand	  out	  for	  lawyers:	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
Aufsichtsrat	   in	   contributing	   to	   the	   ‘insider’	   system	   of	   corporate	   governance	   and	   finance	  
through	  the	  presence	  of	  investment	  banking	  interests	  among	  its	  members,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  
investment	   banks	   in	   the	   process	   of	   German	   industrial	   concentration	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   the	  
Konzerne.	  	  
	  
The	   controlling	   role	   of	   investment	   banks	   is	   explained	   by	   Alexander	   Gerschenkron,	  
according	  to	  whom	  Germany,	  as	  a	  moderately	  backward	  country,	   required	  that	  universal	  
banks	  supplied	  finance	  and	  guided	  industrial	  growth.77	  Subsequent	  economic	  studies	  have	  
                                            
73	  Id.,	  for	  KGaA,	  Art.	  175e	  and	  Art.	  191,	  which	  also	  applies	  to	  AGs	  under	  Art.224.	  
74	   Id.,	   Art.	   225a.	   The	   supervisory	   function	   of	   the	  Aufsichtsrat	   is	   established	   by	   Art.	   225.	   On	   the	   duties	   of	   the	  
Vorstand,	   see	   Arts.	   227-­‐241.	   Members	   of	   the	   Vorstand	   are	   also	   subject	   to	   the	   duty	   of	   care	   of	   the	   ordinary	  
businessman:	  Art.	  241.	  
75	  DEUTSCHE	  HANDELSGESETZBUCH	  VOM	  10	  MAI	  1897	  [RGBl],	  1	  Jan.	  1900,	  s.	  219.	  
76	  See	  Levy,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  132-­‐133;	  see	  also	  JAN	  VON	  HEIN,	  DIE	  REZEPTION	  US-­‐AMERIKANISCHEN	  GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS	  IN	  
DEUTSCHLAND	   99-­‐100	   (Reception	   of	   United	   States	   Corporate	   Law	   in	   Germany,	   2008),	   who	   notes	   that	   little	  
comparative	  law	  analysis	  infomred	  the	  codification	  of	  1897.	  
77	   Alexander	   Gerschenkron,	   The	   Modernisation	   of	   Entrepreneurship,	   in	   CONTINUITY	   IN	   HISTORY	   AND	   OTHER	   ESSAYS	  
(1968),	  at	  137:	  “The	  German	  investment	  banks	  -­‐	  a	  powerful	  invention,	  comparable	  in	  economic	  effect	  to	  that	  of	  
the	   steam	  engine	   -­‐	  were	   in	   their	   capital-­‐supplying	   functions	   a	   substitute	   for	   the	   insufficiency	  of	   the	  previously	  
created	   wealth	   willingly	   placed	   at	   the	   disposal	   of	   entrepreneurs.”	   See	   also	   Alexander	   Gerschenkron,	   The	  
Approach	  to	  European	  Industrialization:	  A	  Postscript,	  in	  ECONOMIC	  BACKWARDNESS	  IN	  HISTORICAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  353-­‐354	  
(1962).	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reinforced	   this	   view.78	   German	   corporate	   law	   is	   seen	   as	   instrumental	   in	   this	   process	   of	  
bank	  domination.	  Bank	  representatives	  could	  sit	  on	  the	  supervisory	  boards	  of	  companies.	  
When	   these	  were	  made	  compulsory	  under	   the	  1884	  Law,	  Gerschenkron	  argued	   that	   this	  
furthered	  the	   influence	  of	  universal	  banks	  over	   the	  German	  corporate	  system	  and	   led	   to	  
the	   increased	   concentration	   of	   German	   industry	   through	   inter-­‐locking	   directorships	   and	  
mergers.79	  	  
	  
This	   has	   become	   a	   contentious	   issue	   given	   more	   recent	   research	   findings	   by	   economic	  
historians	   of	   Germany.	   Several	   studies	   point	   out	   that	   the	   universal	   banks	   wielded	   less	  
influence	   than	   the	   conventional	   view	   suggests.80	   The	   historical	   evidence	   shows	   that	  
investment	  banks	  could	  influence	  the	  supervisory	  board,	  especially	  where	  they	  held	  proxy	  
votes	   by	   reason	   of	   their	   role	   as	   intermediaries	   in	   securities	   markets.	   This	   allowed	  
investment	  banks	  to	  insert	  clauses	  in	  their	  terms	  of	  business,	  permitting	  them	  to	  exercise	  
proxy	  votes	  on	  behalf	  of	   their	   shareholding	   customers,	   thereby	   complying	  with	   the	   legal	  
requirement	   that	   proxy	   voting	   could	   only	   occur	   upon	   the	   express	   permission	   of	   the	  
                                            
78	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  CAROLINE	  FOHLIN,	  FINANCE	  CAPITALISM	  AND	  GERMANY’S	  RISE	  TO	   INDUSTRIAL	  POWER	  31-­‐37	  (2007).	  
See	  also,	  e.g.,	  ALFRED	  CHANDLER,	  SCALE	  AND	  SCOPE:	  THE	  DYNAMICS	  OF	  INDUSTRIAL	  CAPITALISM	  417-­‐419	  (1990);	  Marco	  Da	  
Rin	   &	   Thomas	   Hellmann,	   Banks	   as	   Catalyst	   for	   Industrialisation,	   11	   J.	   OF	   FIN.	   INTERMEDIATION	   266	   (2002);	   TONI	  
PIERENKEMPER	   &	   RICHARD	   TILLY,	   THE	   GERMAN	   ECONOMY	   DURING	   THE	   NINETEENTH	   CENTURY	   (2004),	   at	   Chatper	   7;	   for	   a	  
Marxist	   interpretation,	   see	   RUDOLPH	   HILFERDING,	   FINANCE	   CAPITAL	   (1910)	   (Tom	   Bottomore	   trans.,	   1981);	   see	   also	  
Marco	   Da	   Rin,	   Understanding	   the	   Development	   of	   German	   Kreditbanken,	   1850-­‐1914:	   an	   Approach	   from	   the	  
Economics	  of	  Information,	  3	  FIN.’L	  HIST.	  REV.	  29	  (1996),	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  development	  of	  effective	  systems	  for	  
information	   gathering	   by	   the	   universal	   banks	  was	   key	   to	   their	   ability	   to	   control	   industrial	   enterprises	   in	  which	  
they	  held	  an	  interest.	  	  	  
79	  See	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  33-­‐34,	  citing	  Gerschenkron:	  	  “[T]hrough	  the	  development	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  
supervisory	  boards	  to	  the	  most	  powerful	  organs	  within	  corporate	  organisations,	  the	  banks	  acquired	  a	  formidable	  
degree	  of	  ascendancy	  over	  industrial	  enterprises,	  which	  extended	  far	  beyond	  the	  sphere	  of	  financial	  control	  into	  
that	   of	   entrepreneurial	   and	   managerial	   decisions.”	   See,	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   1884	   Law	   on	   corporate	  
concentration,	  Norbert	  Reich,	  Auswirkungen	  der	   deutschen	  Aktienrechtsreform	  von	  1884	  auf	   die	  Konzentrazion	  
der	  deutschen	  Wirtschaft,	  in	  RECHT	  UND	  ENTWICKLUNG	  DER	  GROSSUNTERNEHMEN	  IM	  19.	  UND	  FRUHEN	  20	  JAHRHUNDERT;	  LAW	  
AND	  THE	  FORMATION	  OF	  BIG	  ENTERPRISES	   IN	   THE	  19TH	  AND	  EARLY	  20TH	  CENTURIES	  255-­‐273	   (Norbert	  Horn	  &	   Jurgen	  Kocha	  
eds.,	   1979).	   See	   also,	   Norbert	   Horn,	   Aktienrechtliche	   Unternehmensorganisation	   in	   der	   Hochindustialisierung	  
(1860-­‐1920)	   Deutschland,	   England,	   Frankreich	   und	   die	   USA	   im	   Vergleich,	   in	   RECHT	   UND	   ENTWICKLUNG	   DER	  
GROSSUNTERNEHMEN	  IM	  19.	  UND	  FRUHEN	  20	  JAHRHUNDERT;	  LAW	  AND	  THE	  FORMATION	  OF	  BIG	  ENTERPRISES	  IN	  THE	  19TH	  AND	  EARLY	  
20TH	  CENTURIES,	  123-­‐189	  (Norbert	  Horn	  &	  Jurgen	  Kocha	  eds.,	  1979).	  	  	  
80	  See	  PIERENKEMPER	  &	  TILLY,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  120-­‐121;	  Jeremy	  Edwards	  &	  Sheilagh	  Ogilvie,	  Universal	  Banks	  and	  
German	   Industrialization:	   a	   Reappraisal,	   XLIX	   ECONOMIC	   HISTORY	   REVIEW	   427	   (1996);	   for	   a	   summary	   of	   the	  main	  
authorities	  for	  and	  against	  the	  bank	  dominance	  thesis,	  see	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  40-­‐44.	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shareholder.81	  Consequently,	  banks	  could	  exert	  influence	  through	  the	  general	  meeting	  as	  
to	  long-­‐term	  strategic	  decisions	  and	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  supervisory	  board.82	  	  
	  
However,	  when	   the	  economic	   context	   is	   analyzed,	   the	   resulting	  picture	   suggests	   at	   least	  
the	   possibility	   of	   lesser	   influence.	   First,	   the	   incidence	   of	   bank	   representation	   on	   the	  
supervisory	   board	   is	   limited	   to	   certain	   sectors	   of	   heavy	   industry,	   specifically	   mining,	  
transport	  and	  the	  electro-­‐technical	  sectors.83	  These	  represent	  only	  a	  small	  proportion	  of	  all	  
industrial	  firms.	  By	  1913	  only	  17.7%	  of	  total	  industrial	  capital	  stock	  was	  held	  by	  joint	  stock	  
companies.84	  The	  majority	  of	   industrial	  enterprises	   in	  this	  period	  were	  small	  and	  medium	  
sized	   firms	   (SMEs)	   of	   the	  Mittelstand.	   They	   were	   locally	   funded	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   small	  
savings	   and	   cooperative	   banks	   (which	   may	   or	   may	   not	   have	   had	   seats	   on	   the	   board),	  
though	  this	  varied	  by	  region	  and	  industry,	  reflecting	  the	  relatively	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  
the	   German	   economy.85	   Even	   the	   major	   industrial	   concerns	   of	   the	   first	   era	   of	   German	  
industrialization,	   the	  railways,	  were	  mostly	   funded	  by	   the	  state,	  except	   in	  Prussia,	  where	  
funding	  was	  organized	  through	  joint	  stock	  corporations	  incorporated	  by	  concession.86	  	  	  
	  
Secondly,	   the	   alleged	   power	   of	   the	   banks	   does	   not	   match	   up	   to	   the	   actual	   use	   of	  
investment	   bank	   finance	   by	   corporations.	   The	   largest	   industrial	   concerns	   were	   able	   to	  
reinvest	   their	   own	   funds	   and	   bank	   finance	   was	   used	   in	   specific	   cases	   to	   cover	   for	   long	  
returns	  on	   investment	  or	   to	  weather	  a	   short	   term	  crisis.87	  The	  apparent	   influence	  of	   the	  
banks	  would	   only	   appear	  where	   their	   views	   coincided	  with	   those	   of	   the	  main	   industrial	  
                                            
81	  Franks,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  7;	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  121-­‐125.	  
82	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  122.	  
83	  For	  detailed	  data	  on	  the	  actual	  numbers	  of	  bank	  members	  of	  supervisory	  boards,	  bank	  shareholding	  patterns	  in	  
non	   financial	   firms	  and	   interlocking	  directorships	  of	  bank	   representatives,	  all	  of	  which,	   she	  asserts,	   show	  more	  
limited	   involvement	   than	   the	   Gerschenkron	   thesis	   supposes,	   see	   FOHLIN,	   supra	   note	   78,	   at	   43	   and	   Chapter	   5.	  
However,	  not	  all	  proponents	  of	  the	  bank	  dominance	  thesis	  are	  convinced:	  see	  note	  101,	  infra.	  
84	  Edwards,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  436.	  
85	   See	   also,	   Richard	   Deeg,	  On	   the	   Development	   of	   Universal	   Banking	   in	   Germany,	   in	   THE	   ORIGINS	   OF	   NATIONAL	  
FINANCIAL	  SYSTEMS:	  ALEXANDER	  GERSCHENKRON	  RECONSIDERED	  87	  (Douglas	  Forsyth	  &	  Daniel	  Verdier	  eds.,	  2003).	  
86	  Edwards,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  434.	  
87	  Id.	  at	  437-­‐440.	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owners	   and	   managers,	   who	   retained	   overall	   control	   of	   business	   policy.88	   Indeed,	  
Neuberger	  suggests	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  bank	  domination	  can	  be	  tested	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  
close	   personal,	   and	   even	   family,	   ties	   between	   leading	   industrialists	   and	   senior	   figures	   in	  
the	   investment	   banking	   community,	  which	   puts	   the	   relationship	   on	   rather	   different	   and	  
more	   equal	   ground.89	   Furthermore,	   where	   firms	   merged,	   funding	   would	   often	   involve	  
numerous	   banks	   that	   were	   part	   of	   a	   consortium.	   Their	   influence	   would	   be	   limited	   by	  
internal	  competition	  between	  them.90	  	  
	  
A	   further	   complicating	   factor	   concerns	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   rise	   of	   universal	   banks	   and	   the	  
process	   of	   German	   industrial	   development,	   which,	   as	   noted	   above,	   can	   be	   dated	   from	  
railway	  development	  in	  the	  mid	  19th	  century.	  As	  Fohlin	  notes,	  
	  
“[t]he	   era	   of	   formal	   bank	   control	  must…have	   been	   shorter	   than	   the	   traditional	  
account	   suggests.	   Since	   there	  were	   few	   joint	   stock	   companies	   to	   control	  before	  
1870,	   and	   since	  half	   of	   the	   great	  banks	  were	   founded	  after	   1870,	   the	  period	  of	  
universal	   bank	   domination,	   if	   it	   ever	   existed,	   could	   have	   spanned	   at	   most	   two	  
decades	   –	   the	   1870s	   and	   1880s.	   It	   is	   therefore	   difficult	   to	   reconcile	   the	   idea	   of	  
bank	  power	  with	  the	  actual	  timing	  of	  events.”91	  	  	  
	  
Though	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  bank	  involvement	  in	  the	  supervisory	  boards	  of	  certain	  sectors	  
of	  heavy	   industry	  during	  this	  period,	   that	  evidence	   is	  now	  known	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  small	  
non-­‐representative	  set	  of	   firms	  over	  a	   limited	  period	  of	  time	  and	   is	  drawn	   largely	   from	  a	  
small	  number	  of	  contemporary	  authors	  who	  were	  either	  directly	   involved	   in	   the	  banking	  
sector	  or,	  like	  Rudolf	  Hilferding,	  were	  socialist	  critics	  of	  “finance	  capitalism.”92	  
                                            
88	  See	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  630;	  see	  also	   LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  128,	  142-­‐145,	  who	  notes	   that	   supervisory	  
boards	  were	  not	  very	  effective	  at	  control	  over	  managers	  and	  that	  managers	  acquired	  the	  upper	  hand	  over	   the	  
aufsichtsrat	  and	  the	  generalversammelung.	  
89	  Hugh	  Neuburger,	  The	  Industrial	  Politics	  of	  the	  Kreditbanken,	  1880-­‐1914,	  51	  BUS.	  HIST.	  REV.	  190	  (1977).	  	  
90	  Edwards,	  supra	  note	  80,	  at	  440.	  
91	  See	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  43.	  
92	  See	   FOHLIN,	  supra	   note	  78,	  at	  45,	   citing	   JACOB	  REISSER,	  DIE	  DEUTSCHEN	  GROSSBANKEN	  UND	   IHRE	  KONZENTRATION	   (The	  
German	  banks	  and	  their	  concentration,	  1910),	  who	  was	  a	  director	  of	  one	  of	  the	  universal	  banks,	  OTTO	  JEIDELS,	  DAS	  
VERHALTNIS	  DER	  DEUTSCHEN	  GROSSBANKEN	  ZUR	   INDUSTIRE	   (The	   relationship	  of	  German	  banks	   for	   industry,	  1905),	  who	  
was	  a	  bank	  employee,	  and	  HILFERDING,	  supra	  note	  78.	  For	  criticisms	  of	  Hilferding’s	  analysis,	  see	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  
58,	  at	  630;	  see	  also,	  Neuberger,	  supra	  note	  89,	  who	  doubts	  that	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  “dictatorship	  of	  the	  banks”	  
asserted	   by	   Hilferding	   and	   Gerschenkron	   can	   survive	   empirical	   analysis.	   Subsequent	   research	   has	   proved	   him	  
correct.	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Indeed,	  by	  1900	   it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  power	  of	  banks	  was	  on	  the	  wane,	  especially	   in	  
the	  mining	  and	  steel	  industries,	  where	  most	  of	  the	  research	  showing	  bank	  domination	  had	  
focused,	  and	  before	  the	  era	  of	  greatest	  industrial	  concentration	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.93	  	  	  
	  
Finally,	  the	  bank	  domination	  thesis	  can	  be	  challenged	  by	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  parallel	  system	  
of	  corporate	   finance	   in	   late	  19th	  century	  Germany,	  which	  allowed	   for	   the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  
bank	   finance	   with	   active	   stock	   markets.94	   Indeed	   the	   rise	   of	   stock	   markets	   in	   late	   19th	  
century	  Germany	  was	  facilitated	  by	  the	  freedom	  of	  incorporation	  under	  the	  Laws	  of	  1870	  
and	   1884.	   Equally,	   the	   shareholder	   protection	   standards	   introduced	   by	   the	   1884	   Law	  
furthered	  this	  goal.	  	  
	  
Subsequent	  legislative	  developments	  do	  not	  contradict	  the	  facilitative	  role	  of	  German	  Law.	  
In	   particular,	   the	   strengthening	   of	   shareholder	   protection	   standards	   in	   the	   1896	  
Börsengesetz,	   following	   on	   from	   severe	   stock	   price	   declines	   and	   sensational	   cases	   of	  
embezzlement	  and	  other	  stock	  transaction	  abuses,	  created	  a	  better	  level	  of	  protection	  for	  
shareholders	  than	  could	  be	  found	  in	  contemporary	  English	  laws.95	  The	  1896	  Law	  allowed	  
for	  tighter	  listing	  requirements	  and	  created	  new	  institutions	  to	  oversee	  new	  share	  issues,	  
the	   Staatskommissar,	   the	   judicial	   Ehrengericht	   and	   an	   expert	   committee,	   the	  
Börsenausschuss.96	   It	  also	  covered	  the	  regulation	  of	  conversion	  of	  private	  firms	  into	  AGs,	  
which	  became	  the	  most	  significant	  type	  of	  corporate	  floatation	  on	  the	  stock	  market	  by	  the	  
early	   years	   of	   the	   20th	   century.97	   Together,	   these	   changes	   should	   have	   improved	  
confidence	  in	  exchanges	  and	  promoted	  the	  greater	  use	  of	  securities	  and	  equities.98	  	  
                                            
93	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  41-­‐43,	  and	  the	  sources	  cited	  therein.	  	  
94	  See	  e.g.,	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  and	  Caroline	  Fohlin,	  Does	  Civil	  Law	  Tradition	  and	  Universal	  Banking	  Crowd	  out	  
Securities	  Markets?,	  8(3)	  ENTERPRISE	  AND	  SOC.	  602	  (2007).	  
95	   Franks,	   supra	   note	   57,	   at	   4-­‐5.	   See	   further,	   WOLFGANG	   SCHULTZ,	   DAS	   DEUTSCHE	   BORSENGESETZ:	   DIE	  
ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE	   UND	   WIRTSCHAFLICHEN	   AUSWIRKUNGEN	   DES	   BORSENGESETZES	   VON	   1896	   (The	   German	   Stock	  
Exchange	  Act:	  The	  History	  and	  Economic	  Impact	  of	  the	  Exchange	  Act,	  1994);	  for	  a	  critical	  contemporary	  appraisal,	  
see	   Ernst	   Loeb,	   The	   German	   Exchange	   Act	   of	   1896,	   11	   THE	   QTR’LY	   J.	   OF	   ECON.	   388	   (1897),	   available	   at:	  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1880717?origin=JSTOR-­‐pdf (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
96	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  94,	  at	  615.	  
97	  Id.	  
98	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  232.	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However,	   the	   1896	   Law	   has	   been	   held	   up	   as	   an	   example	   of	   German	   suppression	   of	  
securities	  markets	  because	  it	  also	  prohibited	  futures	  trading	  contracts	   in	  the	  securities	  of	  
mining	  and	  manufacturing	  enterprises.	  According	  to	  Fohlin,	  this	  was	  a	  result	  of	  successful	  
lobbying	  by	  Prussian	  landed	  interests	  rather	  than	  a	  principled	  attack	  on	  securities	  markets	  
and	  so	  cannot	  be	  seen	  as	  evidence	  of	  official	  opposition	  to	  this	  type	  of	  financing	  in	  favour	  
of	  universal	  bank	  lending.99	  The	  ban	  was	  lifted	  in	  1908,	  but	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  prohibition	  
on	   banking	   concentration,	   caused	   by	   increased	   demand	   for	   banks	   to	   provide	   futures	  
trading	  facilities	  through	  expanding	  networks,	  could	  not	  be	  reversed.100	  	  
	  
Thus,	   one	   central	   feature	   commonly	   associated	   with	   German	   corporate	   law,	   the	  
domination	   of	   the	   Aufsichtsrat	   by	   universal	   investment	   banks,	   leading	   to	   concentration	  
and	  policy	  coordination	  between	  businesses,	  is	  open	  to	  debate	  so	  far	  as	  the	  19th	  century	  is	  
concerned,	   though	   the	  more	   traditional	   position	   remains	   influential.101	   Equally,	   German	  
industrial	  concentration	  in	  this	  period	  is	  perhaps	  no	  different	  from	  the	  same	  processes	  in	  
other	  industrializing	  nations	  and	  can	  be	  better	  explained	  by	  reference	  to	  economic	  factors	  
rather	   than	   as	   a	   result	   of	   peculiar	   local	   legal	   factors.102	   It	   would	   appear	   that	   the	  most	  
important	  variable	  for	  firm	  concentration	  in	  this	  period	  in	  Germany,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK	  is	  
external	  growth	  conditioned	  by	  capital	  market	  conditions.103	  	  
	  
The	  facilitative	  role	  of	  law	  in	  this	  process	  is	  best	  seen	  in	  the	  abolition	  of	  prohibitions	  over	  a	  
corporation	   owning	   shares	   in	   another.104	   According	   to	   Grossfeld,	   this	   was	   known	   in	  
Germany	   in	   the	   1840s	   and	   was	   accepted	   by	   the	   German	   Supreme	   Commercial	   Court	  
                                            
99	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  94,	  at	  616-­‐617.	  
100	  Id.	  at	  618.	  
101	  See	  further,	  the	  critique	  of	  Fohlin’s	  views	  by	  Alexander	  Dyke,	  in	  his	  response	  to	  Caroline	  Fohlin,	  The	  History	  of	  
Corporate	  Ownership	  and	  Control	   in	  Germany,	   in	  A	  HISTORY	  OF	  CORPORATE	  GOVERNANCE	  AROUND	  THE	  WORLD:	   FAMILY	  
BUSINESS	  GROUPS	  TO	  PROFESSIONAL	  MANAGERS	  277-­‐281	  (Randall	  Morck	  ed.,	  2005).	  
102	   See	   further	   Leslie	   Hannah,	   Mergers	   Cartels	   and	   Concentration:	   Legal	   Factors	   in	   the	   US	   and	   European	  
Experience,	  in	  Horn,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  306-­‐316.	  
103	   See	   Richard	   Tilley,	  External	   Growth,	   and	   Finance	   in	   the	   Development	   of	   Large-­‐Scale	   Enterprise	   in	   Germany,	  
1880-­‐1913,	  42	  J.	  OF	  ECON.	  HIST.	  629	  (1982).	  
104	  See	  PETER	  MUCHLINSKI,	  MULTINATIONAL	  ENTERPRISES	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  35	  (2007).	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  1990	  
(Reichsoberhandelsgericht)	   in	  1877,	  which	  held	   that	   the	  corporation	  could	  own	  shares	   in	  
the	   same	   manner	   as	   a	   natural	   person.105	   The	   1884	   Law	   required	   the	   registration	   of	  
branches	   in	   the	   Commercial	   Court	   handling	   the	   registration	   process	   but	   contained	   no	  
specific	  rules	  on	  corporate	  groups,	  a	  feature	  of	  later	  German	  laws.106	  	  
	  
Grossfeld	   further	   asserts	   that	   the	   rise	   in	   concentrations	   was	   assisted	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  
cartels	  were	  seen	  as	  lawful	  by	  the	  German	  courts	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  and	  this	  led	  to	  an	  
acceptance	  of	   corporate	   groups,	   although	  a	  holding	   company	   could	  be	  prohibited	  under	  
Art.43	   of	   the	   Bürgerliches	   Gesetzbuch	   where	   it	   was	   seen	   as	   endangering	   the	   public	  
interest.107	  	  
	  
The	   relationship	   between	   merger	   activity	   and	   the	   legal	   regulation	   of	   cartels	   is	   a	  
problematic	  issue.	  Tilley	  suggests	  that	  differing	  levels	  of	  merger	  activity	  could	  be	  attributed	  
to	  different	  levels	  of	  incorporation	  and	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  prohibitions	  on	  cartels,	  
suggesting	  that	  the	  high	  level	  of	  merger	  activity	  in	  the	  US	  at	  this	  time	  was	  in	  part	  a	  result	  of	  
the	   prohibition	   of	   cartels	   in	   US	   law,	   while	   cartels	   remained	   lawful	   in	   Britain	   and	  
Germany.108	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  Cornish	  argues,	  the	  actual	  relationship	  between	  anti-­‐
cartel	  laws	  and	  industrial	  concentration	  cannot	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  simple	  cause	  and	  effect	  
analysis	   as	   it	   involves	   a	  myriad	   of	   legal	   factors	   and	   business	   judgments	   that	   need	   to	   be	  
assessed	   by	   the	   businesses	   in	   question,	   including	   the	   risk	   of	   enforcement	   actions.	  
Therefore,	  a	  more	  case	  specific	  approach	  is	  needed.109	  	  
	  
Also	   open	   to	   debate	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   Kaiserreich	   actively	   encouraged	   industrial	  
concentration	  and	   the	   rise	  of	   “Corporatism”	   (Korporatismus)	  beyond	  a	   legal	   tolerance	  of	  
cartels.110	   As	   noted	   above,	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   various	   corporate	   laws	   and	   of	   the	  
                                            
105	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  149-­‐150.	  
106	  GESETZ	  BETREFFEND	  DIE	  KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	  AUF	  AKTIEN	  UND	  DIE	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	  VOM	  18	  JULI	  1884,	  supra	  
note	  56;	  for	  KGaA,	  Art.	  179;	  for	  AG,	  Art.	  212.	  
107	  GROSSFELD,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  154-­‐155.	  
108	  See	  Tilley,	  supra	  note	  103.	  	  
109	  See	  William	  Cornish,	  Legal	  Control	  over	  Cartels	  and	  Monopolisation	  1880-­‐1914	  A	  Comparison,	   in	  Horn,	  supra	  
note	  78,	  at	  280-­‐305.	  
110	  “Corporatism”	   is	  used	  here	  to	  denote	  a	  system	  of	   industrial	  organisation	   in	  which	  the	  State	  co-­‐ordinates,	  or	  
directs,	   corporate	   and	   sectoral	   policy	   in	   co-­‐operation	   with	   the	   representatives	   of	   business	   and	   industry	   and,	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Börsengesetz	  was	  broadly	  facilitative	  for	  business.111	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  uncertain	  that	  the	  
central	   government	   could	   act	   in	   this	   way,	   given	   the	   reality	   of	   relatively	   de-­‐centralized	  
government	   and	   economy	   in	  Germany	   at	   the	   time	   and	   the	   dominant	   force	   of	   economic	  
liberalism	   in	   the	  politics	   of	   the	   age.112	   Thus,	   the	   rise	   of	  German	   corporatism	  as	   a	  major	  
influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  corporate	  law	  belongs	  to	  a	  later	  period.	  
	  
The	  remaining	  development	  in	  this	  period	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  limited	  liability	  corporate	  
form	   to	   SMEs,	   through	   the	  GmbH.	   This	  was	   introduced	   under	   the	  Gesetz	   Betreffend	   die	  
Gesellschaften	  mit	  Beschränkter	  Haftung	  of	  1892.113	  The	  GmbH	  is	  a	  capital	  holding	  entity	  
with	   separate	   legal	   personality	   from	   its	   members	   and	   limited	   liability.114	   This	   was	  
established	   for	   small	   groups	   of	   shareholders	   with	   close	   personal	   links,	   who	   would	   not	  
ordinarily	   trade	   their	   shares,	   but	  who	   needed	   a	   form	   of	   limited	   liability	   association	   that	  
                                                                                                                
where	  politically	  acceptable,	  organised	  labour	  and	  worker	  representatives.	  On	  the	  problems	  of	  this	  concept,	  see	  
Leo	  Panitch,	  Recent	  Theorizations	  of	  Corporatism:	  Reflections	  on	  a	  Growth	  Industry,	  31	  BRIT.	  J.	  OF	  SOC.	  159	  (1980).	  
On	  the	  historical	  roots	  of	  German	  corporatism	  in	  the	  Kaiserreich,	  see	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  58,	  at	  662-­‐680.	  
111	   See	   further	   VON	   HEIN,	   supra	   note	   76	   at	   143,	   who	   argues	   that	   the	   reforms	   of	   1870	   and	   1884	   were	   typical	  
products	  of	  liberalism	  based	  on	  private	  law	  principles	  that	  were	  compatible	  with	  the	  basic	  premises	  that	  informed	  
English	   and	   French	   law	  of	   the	   time.	   To	  have	   considered	   these	   laws	   as	   interventionist	   at	   that	   time	  would	  have	  
appeared	  as	  a	  relapse	  into	  the	  concession	  system	  which	  they	  had	  been	  adopted	  to	  replace.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  see	  
F.A.	  Mann,	  The	  New	  German	  Company	  Law	  and	   its	  Background,	  19	   J.	  COMP.	   LEGIS.	  &	   INT'L	   L.	  3D	   SER.	  220,	  at	  223	  
(1937).	  See	  also	  Richard	  Overy,	  State	  and	  Industry	  in	  Germany	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century,	  12(2)	  GERMAN	  HISTORY	  180	  
(1994),	  who	  notes	  (at	  181)	  that	  in	  the	  period	  from	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  to	  1916,	  “[t]he	  state	  certainly	  interfered	  
more	   in	   German	   economic	   life	   than	   was	   the	   case	   in	   Britain	   or	   the	   United	   States,	   but	   the	   gap	   should	   not	   be	  
exaggerated.	  Industry	  did	  much	  of	  its	  own	  regulating,	  through	  cartels	  and	  trusts.	  When	  war	  broke	  out	  in	  1914,	  it	  
was	  industry	  that	  took	  up	  the	  challenge	  of	  war	  production…Up	  to	  1916	  the	  domestic	  war	  economy	  was	  still	   left	  
mainly	   to	  private	   initiative.	  ”	  For	   the	  argument	   that	   the	   reform	  of	  1884	  represented	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  position,	  see	  
SHAWN	  DONNELLY,	  ANDREW	  GAMBLE,	  GREGORY	  JACKSON	  &	  JOHN	  PARKINSON,	  THE	  PUBLIC	  INTEREST	  AND	  THE	  COMPANY	  IN	  BRITAIN	  
AND	   GERMANY	   13-­‐16	   (2000),	   available	   	   at:	  
http://www.agf.org.uk/cms/upload/pdfs/CR/2000_CR1215_e_public_interest_and_the_company.pdf (last	  
accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
112	  Fohlin,	  	  supra	  note	  94,	  at	  609-­‐611.	  
113	   GESETZ	   BETREFFEND	   DIE	   GESELLSCHAFTEN	   MIT	   BESCHRANKTER	   HAFTUNG	   VOM	   20	   APRIL	   1892	   (Law	   Concerning	   Private	  
Limited	   Companies,	   20	   April	   1892)	   [GMBH	   GESETZ	   1892],	   20	   Apr.	   1892,	   as	   amended,	   available	   at: 
http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐internet.de/bundesrecht/gmbhg/gesamt.pdf (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   For	   a	  
useful	  brief	  summary,	  see	  Coing,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  127-­‐130.	  
114	  GMBH	  GESETZ	  1892,	  supra	  note	  113,	  Art.	  13.	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was	  not	  as	  complex	  or	  inflexible	  in	  its	  formation	  and	  conduct	  as	  the	  AG.115	  Accordingly,	  the	  
GmbH	  is	  subject	  to	  simplified	  rules	  on	  formation	  and	  does	  not	  need	  to	  have	  a	  supervisory	  
board,	   though	   in	   practice	  many	   of	   today’s	   larger	   GmbHs	   have	   one.116	   Space	   prevents	   a	  
more	  detailed	  discussion	  save	  for	  noting	  that	  the	  GmbH	  has	  lived	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  AG	  
in	   comparative	   corporate	   law	   literature,	  which	   tends	   to	   stress	   the	   role	  of	   the	   joint	   stock	  
corporation	   as	   the	   main	   vehicle	   for	   industrial	   development,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   most	  
German	  business	  enterprises	  of	  the	  period	  do	  not	  adopt	  that	  legal	  form.117	  	  
	  
	  
D.	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  1897-­‐1945	  
	  
The	   corporate	   law	   system	   described	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   remained	   in	   place	   until	   the	  
Emergency	  Corporate	  Law	  Measures	  of	  1931	  (Notverordnung	  –	  NotVO),118	  followed	  by	  the	  
                                            
115	  See	  ANDENAS	  &	  WOOLDRIDGE,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  116,	  and	  further,	  for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  GmbH,	  see	  
Timothy	  Guinnane,	  Ron	  Harris,	  Naomi	  Lamoreaux	  &	  Jean-­‐Laurent	  Rosenthal,	  Putting	  the	  Corporation	  in	  its	  Place,	  
8(3)	  ENTER.	  AND	  SOC’Y	  687,	  697-­‐703	  (2007).	  They	  stress	  the	  difficulties	  of	   incorporation	  under	  the	  1884	  Law	  as	  a	  
factor	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  GmbH.	  Perhaps,	  the	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  German	  business	  ownership	  of	  
the	  time	  and	  in	  the	  continued	  importance	  of	  family	  owned	  enterprises	  and	  of	  smaller	  entities	  that	  did	  not	  need,	  
or	  want,	  the	  AG	  form	  but	  wanted	  limited	  liability.	  	  
116	   See	  e.g.,	   BUNDESVERBAND	   DER	   DEUTSCHEN	   INDUSTRIE	   E.	   V.	   [BDI]	   [Federation	   of	  German	   Industries],	  MAJOR	   FAMILY	  
BUSINESSES	   IN	   GERMANY	   FACTS,	   FIGURES,	   POTENTIAL	   21	   (2012),	   available	   at:	   http://www.ifm-­‐
bonn.org/assets/documents/BDI-­‐major-­‐family-­‐businesses-­‐Spring-­‐2012.pdf (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013);	  
family	  run	  GmbH’s	  may	  have	  a	  supervisory	  board	  due	  to	  provisions	  in	  the	  company	  contract	  or	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
requirements	  of	  the	  Co-­‐determination	  Laws.	  
117	  See	  also	  Guinnane,	  supra	   note	  115,	  undertaking	  a	   comparative	   study	  of	   the	  development	  of	  private	   limited	  
liability	  corporations	  in	  the	  UK,	  US,	  France	  and	  Germany.	  On	  the	  19th	  century	  figures,	  see	  Edwards,	  supra	  note	  80.	  
Contemporary	  figures	  show	  that	  the	  SME	  sector	  still	  dominates	  the	  German	  economy.	  According	  to	  the	  German	  
Federal	   Ministry	   of	   Economics	   and	   Technology	   ,	   “Small	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   companies	   in	   Germany	   represent	  
99.7%	  of	   all	   businesses,	   produce	  38%	  of	   taxable	   turnover,	   account	   for	   nearly	   49%	  of	   total	   net	   value	   added	  by	  
companies,	  and	  provide	  roughly	  60%	  of	  all	  jobs	  requiring	  social	  insurance	  contributions.”	  See	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  
Economics	   and	   Technology,	   Policy	   for	   small	   and	   medium-­‐sized	   businesses	   (2012),	   available	   at:	  	  
http://www.bmwi.de/English/Navigation/Economic-­‐policy/small-­‐business-­‐policy.html	   (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	  
2013).	  	  
118	   VERORDNUNG	   DES	   REICHSPRESIDANTEN	   UBER	   AKTEINRECHT,	   BANKENAUSSICHTT	   UND	   UBER	   DIE	   STEUERAMNESTIE	   VOM	   19	  
SEPTEMBER	   1931	   REICHSGESETZBLATT	   [RGBI],	   19	   Sep.	   1931,	   HISTORISCHE	   RECHTS-­‐	   UND	   GESETZESTEXTE	   ONLINE	  
OSTERREICHISCHE	   NATIONALBIBLIOTEK,	   Teil	   1	   Nr.63	   s.493,	   ALEX	   available	   at:	   http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-­‐
content/alex?aid=dra&datum=1931&page=591&size=45 (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   	  More	   generally,	   see	  
Richard	  Rosendorff,	  The	  New	  German	  Company	  Act	  and	  the	  English	  Companies	  Act	  1929,	  Part	  I,	  14	  J.	  COMP.	  LEGIS.	  
&	   INT'L	   L.	  3D	   SER.	  94	   (1932),	  Richard	  Rosendorff,	  The	  New	  German	  Company	  Act	  and	   the	  English	  Companies	  Act	  
1929,	  Part	   II,	  15	  J.	  COMP.	  LEGIS.	  &	  INT'L	  L.	  3D	  SER.	  112	  (1933);	  Richard	  Rosendorff,	  The	  New	  German	  Company	  Act	  
and	  the	  English	  Companies	  Act	  1929,	  Part	  III,	  15	  J.	  COMP.	  LEGIS.	  &	  INT'L	  L.	  3D	  SER.	  242	  (1933).	  
	  	   	   	  	  	  	  [Vol.	  14	  No.	  02 362	   G e rman 	   L aw 	   J o u r n a l 	  
Corporate	  Law	  of	  1937	  (Aktiengesetz).119	  The	  period	  from	  around	  1916	  up	  to	  1945	  is	  one	  
of	   fundamental	   conceptual	   change	   in	  German	   corporate	   law	   thinking.	   In	   this	   period	   the	  
liberal	  conception	  of	  corporate	   law	   is	  challenged	  and	  major	   legislative	   inroads	  are	  made.	  
This	   is	   attributable	   to:	   the	   impact	   of	   the	   two	  World	  Wars	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	  
private	  enterprise	  and	  the	  state;	  the	  political	  turmoil	  of	  early	  post	  World	  War	  I	  Germany,	  
with	   the	   short	   lived	   socialist	   revolution	   and	   the	   need	   to	   accommodate	   the	   left	   in	   the	  
political	  settlement	  of	  the	  Weimer	  Republic;	  the	  consequential	  rise	  of	  new	  corporatist	  and	  
state	  socialist	  thinking	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  business	  and	  society;	  the	  economic	  
crises	  of	  1924	  and	  1929	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  German	  corporations;	  and	  the	  anti-­‐capitalism	  
and	  racism	  of	  the	  Nazi	  era.	  	  
	  
An	  important	  figure	  in	  this	  process	  is	  Walther	  Rathenau.	  During	  his	  tenure	  as	  head	  of	  the	  
War	   Raw	  Materials	   Department	   of	   the	  War	  Ministry	   (Kriegsrohstoffabteilung),	   Rathenau	  
established	   the	   Kriegsrohstoffgesellschaften.120	   These	   were	   private	   sector	   AGs	   placed	  
under	   the	  control	  of	   the	  State	   that	   retained	  a	  power	  of	  veto.	  The	  principal	  owners	  were	  
given	  State	  sureties	  to	  ensure	  their	  co-­‐operation.	  Twenty-­‐five	  such	  enterprises	  multiplied	  
into	  around	  200	  specialized	  institutions	  and	  so-­‐called	  War	  Committees	  (Kriegsausschusse)	  
that	   by	   1918	   employed	   some	   18,000	   people.	   Such	   entities	   founded	   the	   development	   of	  
German	  corporatism.	  However	  the	  experience	  of	  war	  capitalism	  was	  also	  one	  of	  apparent	  
profiteering	  by	  private	  firms,	  leading	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Reichstag’s	  commission	  in	  
1916,	  which	  found	  significant	  evidence	  of	  this	  practice.121	  	  	  
	  
The	   experience	   of	   war	   capitalism	   led	   Rathenau	   to	   consider	   the	   future	   of	   industrial	  
capitalist	  organization.	  Also	  significant	  were	  the	  ideas	  of	  “organized	  capitalism”	  associated	  
with	  Hilferding,	   the	   state	   socialism	  of	  Plenge	  and	   the	   co-­‐operative	  business	   ideas	  of	   von	  
Moellendorf	   (Gemeinwirtschaft).122	  However,	   it	   is	   in	  Rathenau’s	  work	  Vom	  Aktienwesen,	  
                                            
119	  GESETZ	   UBER	  AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	   UND	   KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	   AUF	   AKTIEN	   (AKTIENGESETZ)	   VOM	  30	   JANUAR	   1937	  
REICHSGESETZBLATT	   (RGBl),	   30	   Jan.	   1937,	   HISTORISCHE	   RECHTS-­‐	   UND	   GESETZESTEXTE	   ONLINE	   OSTERREICHISCHE	  
NATIONALBIBLIOTEK	   (Ger.),	   Teil	   1	   Nr.	   15	   s.	   107,	   ALEX	   available	   at:	   http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-­‐
content/alex?aid=dra&datum=1937&page=213&size=45 (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
120	   See	   HANS-­‐ULRICH	   WEHLER,	   DEUTSCHE	   GESELLSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	   BAND	   4	   1914-­‐1949	   (History	   of	   German	   Society,	  
Volume	  4,	  3rd	  ed.,	  2008)	  at	  47-­‐52	  on	  which	  this	  account	  draws.	  On	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  policy	  on	  Schering	  AG,	  see	  
Christopher	  Kobrak,	  Politics,	  Corporate	  Governance	  and	  the	  Dynamics	  of	  German	  Managerial	  Innovation:	  Schering	  
AG	  between	  the	  Wars,	  3	  ENTER.	  AND	  SOC’Y	  429,	  438	  (2002).	  
121	  See	  WEHLER,	  supra	  note	  120,	  at	  52-­‐54,	  who	   feels	   that	   this	   led	   to	  a	  sharpening	  of	  distributional	  conflicts	   that	  
fuelled	  the	  abortive	  socialist	  revolution	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  
122	  Id.	  at	  57.	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   363	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  Development	  of	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  Until	  1990	  
written	  in	  the	  last	  months	  of	  the	  War,	  that	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  business	  and	  society	  of	  the	  time	  is	  captured.123	  	  	  	  
	  
Rathenau	   saw	   two	   main	   problems	   with	   the	   existing	   system	   of	   corporate	   law:	   the	  
overarching	   power	   of	   directors	   who	   were	   no	   longer	   controlled	   by	   the	   Aufsichtsrat,	   an	  
organ	  that	  was	  in	  need	  of	  revitalization	  if	  it	  was	  to	  perform	  any	  useful	  role,	  and	  the	  ability	  
of	  speculative	  shareholders	  to	  manipulate	  share	  prices	  in	  their	  favour	  and	  to	  the	  detriment	  
of	  the	  corporation,	  who	  did	  not	  deserve	  the	  protection	  of	  their	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  general	  
meeting.124	   He	   also	   saw	   the	   large	   modern	   business	   corporation	   as	   something	   that	  
belonged	  to	  the	  wider	  business	  environment	  of	  the	  country	  and	  which	  worked	  in	  the	  wider	  
social	   interest.	   Consequently,	   it	   could	   no	   longer	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   private	   law	  entity	   but	   one	  
that	   required	   a	   new	   legal	   basis	   in	   public	   interest	   concerns.125	   The	   enterprise	   should	   be	  
recast	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  state	  socialist	  model	  which	  would	  allow	  it	  to	  realize	  its	  industrial	  
and	   technical	   capacity	   and	   minimize	   the	   risk	   of	   speculative	   financial	   manipulation	   that	  
could	  lead	  to	  its	  ruin.126	  	  
	  
Rathenau’s	   views	   met	   with	   a	   mixed	   reception	   when	   the	   reform	   of	   corporate	   law	   was	  
considered	  after	  World	  War	   I.	   In	   legal	  circles	   they	  were	   largely	  dismissed,	  as	   the	   issue	  of	  
protection	   of	   the	   small	   shareholder	   against	   large	   controlling	   interests	   continued	   to	  
dominate	   lawyers	   concerns.127	   Others	   took	   Rathenau’s	   position	   and	   linked	   it	   to	   the	  
critique	   of	   big	   enterprise	   capitalism,	   coming	   out	   of	   the	   US	   at	   the	   time,	   concerning	   the	  
                                            
123	  WALTER	  RATHENAU,	  VOM	  AKTIENWESEN:	  EINE	  GESCHICHTLICHE	  BETRACHTUNG	  (1918).	  
124	  Id.	  at	  13-­‐33.	  
125	   According	   to	   Rathenau,“die	   Grossunternehmung	   ist	   heute	   uberhaupt	   nicht	   mehr	   lediglich	   ein	   Gebilde	  
privatrechtlicher	  Interessen,	  sie	  ist	  vielmehr,	  sowohl	  einzeln	  wie	  in	  ihrer	  Gesamtzhal,	  ein	  nationaliwirschaftlicher,	  
der	   Gesammtheit	   angehoriger	   Faktor,	   der	   zwar	   aus	   feiner	   herkunft,	   zu	   Recht	   oder	   zu	   Unrecht,	   noch	   die	  
privatrechlichen	   Zuge	   des	   reinen	   Erwerbsunternehmens	   tragt,	   wahrend	   er	   langst	   und	   in	   steigendem	   Masse	  
offentlichen	   Interessen	   dienseitbar	   geworden	   ist	   und	   hierdurch	   sich	   ein	   neues	   Dasainreacht	   geschoffen	   hat.”	  
RATHANEAU,	  supra	  note	  123,	  at	  38-­‐39:	  
126	   Id.	   at	   41,	   62.	   This	   approach	   has	   acquired	   the	   label	   “unternehmen	   an	   sich”,	   given	   by	   Haussmann	  when	   he	  
commented	  on	  Rathenau’s	  famous	  rhetorical	  example	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  the	  Deutsche	  Bank	  could	  be	  overvalued	  and	  
then	  forced	  into	  liquidation	  by	  the	  general	  meeting,	  saying	  that	  Rathenau	  had	  posited	  the	  need	  for	  the	  enterprise	  
to	  secure	   the	  undertaking	   for	   itself	  against	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  general	  meeting:	  “Schutz	  des	  Unternehmens	  an	  
sich	   gegenuber	   der	   Mehrheit	   in	   der	   Generalversammlung.”	   See	   VON	   HEIN,	   supra	   note	   76,	   at	   140,	   citing	   FRITZ	  
HAUSSMAN,	  VOM	  AKTIENWESEN	  UND	  AKTIENRECHT	  14,	  27	  (1928).	  
127	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76;	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  226-­‐227,	  who	  links	  Rathenau’s	  ideas	  with	  the	  1937	  Law.	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division	  of	  ownership	  and	  control	  and	  the	  rising	  power	  of	  unaccountable	  management.128	  
However,	  the	  eventual	  changes	   in	  the	   law	  brought	  about	  under	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  did	  
not	  go	  very	  far	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  logic	  of	  corporate	  law.	  
	  
The	   lengthy	   discussion	   process	   for	   reform	   was	   led	   by	   the	   Deutsche	   Juristentag	   (DJT)	  
conferences	   of	   1926	   and	   1928,	   and	   by	   a	   committee	   established	   by	   the	   Ministry	   of	  
Justice.129	   A	   Draft	   Law	   was	   presented	   to	   the	   legislature	   in	   1931	   but	   parts	   of	   it	   were	  
enacted	  on	  19	  September	  1931	  by	  emergency	  order	  (NotVO)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  pressure	  of	  
the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  corporations.130	  In	  particular,	  while	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  
years	   saw	   a	   boom,	   the	   hyperinflation	   of	   1924	   and	   the	   crash	   of	   1929	   caused	   many	  
corporate	   failures	   and	   materially	   affected	   the	   way	   in	   which	   German	   corporations	  
organized	   their	   shareholdings	   and	   their	   accounts.	   Ways	   were	   devised	   to	   hide	   the	   true	  
value	   of	   corporate	   assets	   from	   outsiders	   and	   many	   corporations,	   including	   joint	   stock	  
banks,	  bought	  their	  own	  shares	  and	  so	  reduced	  their	   liable	  capital.131	   	  A	  further	  concern	  
was	  the	  threat	  of	  foreign	  acquisition	  of	  German	  businesses	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  inflation	  
crisis,	  which	  had	  made	  them	  attractive	  targets	  for	  foreign	  takeover.	  The	  corporate	  reaction	  
was	   to	   issue	   shares	   with	   multiple	   voting	   rights	   (Mehrstimmrechtsaktien),	   owned	   by	   a	  
syndicate	   controlled	   by	   management,	   or	   depot	   shares	   (Vorratsaktien),	   which	   were	   also	  
loaded	  with	  multiple	  voting	   rights,	  and	  by	   the	   issue	  of	  preference	   shares	  with	  additional	  
dividend	  payments	  (Vorzugsaktien).132	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  impact	  on	  minority	  shareholders	  
was	  detrimental	  as	  the	  value	  of	  their	  voting	  rights	  was	  undermined.133	  This	  also	  increased	  
the	  voting	  power	  of	  major	  banks	  that	  held	  proxy	  voting	  rights.134	  
                                            
128	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  141-­‐142,	  citing	  Geiler.	  
129	   For	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   process	   and	   of	   the	   role	   played	   by	   US	   ideas,	   see	   id.	   at	   126-­‐169;	   see	   also	  
Rosendorff,	  Part	  I,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  95.	  The	  DJT	  discussions	  of	  1926	  and	  1928	  are	  documented	  in	  QUELLEN	  FUR	  
AKTIENRECHTSREFORM	  DER	  WEIMARER	  REPUBLIC	  1926-­‐31,	  vol.	  1,	  33-­‐205	  (Werner	  Schubert	  ed.,	  1999);	  the	  work	  of	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Justice	  is	  documented	  therein,	  at	  207-­‐442.	  	  	  	  	  
130	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  I,	  supra	  note	  118.	  
131	  See	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  168-­‐169;	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  299.	  
132	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  169-­‐170;	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  262.	  	  
133	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7;	  see	  further	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  149-­‐157.	  
134	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  II,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  113.	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The	  1931	  NotVO	  addressed	  such	  problems	  by	  ensuring	  greater	  transparency	  in	  accounting	  
practices	  and	   in	   the	   information	  offered	   in	   the	  annual	   return,	   the	  balance	  sheet	  and	   the	  
profit	   and	   loss	   account,	   and	   by	   requiring	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   books	   by	   independent	  
auditors.135	  In	  this,	  the	  1931	  reforms	  follow	  the	  approach	  taken	  in	  the	  English	  Companies	  
Act	  1929.136	  It	  remained	  for	  the	  Law	  of	  1937	  to	  fully	  control	  the	  various	  types	  of	  multiple	  
voting,	   depot	   and	   preference	   shares.137	   In	   addition,	   the	   purchase	   of	   a	   company’s	   own	  
shares	   by	   a	   subsidiary	  was	   prohibited	   except	   in	   certain	   narrow	   cases.138	  Minority	   rights	  
were	  also	  strengthened.139	  As	  regards	  the	  governance	  of	  corporations,	  the	  NotVO	  changed	  
the	  role	  of	  the	  Aufsichtsrat	  in	  response	  to	  concerns	  that	  it	  had	  failed	  as	  a	  supervisory	  organ	  
in	  preventing	  the	  collapse	  of	  so	  many	  corporations.140	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  dual	  board	  
system	   was	   scrutinized	   and	   compared	   with	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   unitary	   board	   system.	  
However	   no	   shift	   to	   unitary	   boards	   was	   formally	   accepted.141	   Instead,	   Art.VIII	   of	   the	  
NotVO	   	  stipulated	  that	   the	  rules	   in	   the	  corporate	  statute	   regulating	   the	  composition	  and	  
formation	  of	  the	  supervisory	  board	  and	  the	  remuneration	  of	  its	  members	  would	  terminate	  
at	  the	  next	  general	  meeting,	  to	  be	  replaced	  by	  new	  rules	  voted	  by	  a	  simple	  majority;	  the	  
period	   of	   service	   of	   all	  members	   of	   the	   board	  would	   also	   terminate	   and	   new	  members	  
would	  be	  elected,	  provided	  their	  numbers	  did	  not	  exceed	  thirty	  and	  that	  no	  member	  could	  
sit	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  more	  than	  twenty	  corporations.	  	  
                                            
135	   VERORDNUNG	   DES	   REICHSPRESIDANTEN	   UBER	   AKTEINRECHT,	   BANKENAUSSICHTT	   UND	   UBER	   DIE	   STEUERAMNESTIE	   VOM	   19	  
SEPTEMBER	  1931	  REICHSGESETZBLATT,	  supra	  note	  118,	  	  Arts.	  V	  and	  VI.	  
136	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  III,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  242-­‐246.	  	  
137	   Fohlin,	   supra	   note	   101,	   at	   262-­‐263.	   See	   GESETZ	   UBER	   AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN	   UND	   KOMMANDITGESELLSCHAFTEN	   AUF	  
AKTIEN	  (AKTIENGESETZ)	  VOM	  30	  JANUAR	  1937	  REICHSGESETZBLATT	  (RGBl),	  supra	  note	  119,	  Arts.	  159-­‐168	  on	  pre-­‐emptive	  
rights;	  Arts.	  169-­‐173,	  allowing	  special	  issue	  of	  shares	  without	  permission	  of	  stockholders	  for	  up	  to	  five	  years;	  Art.	  
174,	  specific	  permission	  of	  stockholders	  and	  the	  Reich	  Ministry	  of	  Economics	  needed	  in	  specific	  cases	  of	  issues	  of	  	  
convertible	  and	  participating	  bonds.	  	  Further,	  see	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  235-­‐237.	  	  
138	   VERORDNUNG	   DES	   REICHSPRESIDANTEN	   UBER	   AKTEINRECHT,	   BANKENAUSSICHTT	   UND	   UBER	   DIE	   STEUERAMNESTIE	   VOM	   19	  
SEPTEMBER	  1931	  REICHSGESETZBLATT,	  supra	  note,	  118	  Art.1(1)	  new	  s.	  227	  HGB;	   	  see	  also,	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  III,	  supra	  
note	  118	  at	  248-­‐249.	  This	  was	  carried	  through	  to	  the	  1937	  Law:	  see	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  237-­‐238.	  
139	   VERORDNUNG	   DES	   REICHSPRESIDANTEN	   UBER	   AKTEINRECHT,	   BANKENAUSSICHTT	   UND	   UBER	   DIE	   STEUERAMNESTIE	   VOM	   19	  
SEPTEMBER	  1931	  REICHSGESETZBLATT,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  Art.	  VII	  new	  s.266(3)	  HGB.	  
140	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  II,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  112.	  	  
141	  See	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  161-­‐163;	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  I,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  98-­‐100.	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This	   reform	   sought	   to	   decrease	   the	   perceived	   concentration	   of	   control	   in	   few	   hands	   of	  
major	   corporations,	   a	   process	   that	   characterizes	   this	   period,142	   though	   its	   impact	   was	  
doubted	  at	  the	  time.143	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  NotVO	  did	  not	  have	  any	  developed	  rules	  on	  
holding	   companies	   and	   relations	   with	   controlled	   undertakings.144	   Such	   Konzernrecht	  
would	   not	   fully	   emerge	   until	   the	   Aktiengesetz	   of	   1965.145	   Finally,	   the	   NotVO	   did	   not	  
challenge	   bank	   proxy	   voting,	   although	   the	   accompanying	   emergency	   measures	   on	   the	  
supervision	  of	  banks	  did	  consider	  that	  the	  board	  of	  trustees	  should	  be	  empowered	  to	  lay	  
down	  conditions	  on	  which	  banks	  could	  exercise	  proxy	  votes.146	  	  
	  
The	  rise	  of	  Nazi	  power	  after	  1933	  had	  a	  major	  political	   impact	  on	  German	  corporate	  law.	  
Although	  much	   continued	   from	   the	  1931	   reforms,	   and	   some	  of	   the	  wilder	   anti-­‐capitalist	  
ideas	   were	   pragmatically	   avoided	   to	   ensure	   business	   support	   (which	   also	   led	   to	   some	  
privatizations	  of	  corporations	  that	  had	  been	  nationalized	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  in	  response	  to	  
the	   Great	   Depression),	   the	   1937	   Law	   marked	   a	   shift	   towards	   state	   control	   over	  
corporations.147	  According	  to	  Kessler,	  the	  1937	  Law	  can	  be	  analyzed	  in	  four	  parts:	  firstly,	  it	  
contains	  provisions	  encouraging	  the	  use	  of	  the	  corporate	  form	  for	   large	  businesses	  while	  
discouraging	   the	   use	   of	   limited	   liability	   for	   small	   enterprises;148	   secondly,	   it	   introduces	  
                                            
142	  On	  patterns	  of	   industrial	  concentration	   in	  this	  period,	  see	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  229-­‐230;	  WEHLER,	  supra	  
note	  120,	  at	  262-­‐268.	  
143	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  I,	  supra	  note	  118.	  
144	  See	  Rosendorff,	  Part	  III,	  supra	  note	  118,	  at	  250-­‐253,	  discussing	  the	  proposed	  rules	  of	  holding	  companies	  in	  the	  
1930	  Draft	  Law	  that	  were	  not	  adopted	  in	  the	  NotVO;	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  172.	  
145	  See	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  267.	  
146	  Id.	  at	  113.	  
147	  See	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  172.	  See	  further,	  Kobrak,	  supra	  note	  120.	  On	  Nazi	  privatisations,	  see	  Germa	  Bel,	  
Against	   the	   Mainstream:	   Nazi	   Privatisation	   in	   1930s	   Germany,	   63(1)	   ECON.	   HIST.	   REV.	   34	   (1210).	   According	   to	  
Overy,	   state	   ownership	   became	  much	  more	   widespread	   during	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   particularly	   in	   sectors	  
related	  to	  armaments	  and	  strategic	  industries:	  Overy,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  184.	  For	  example,	  the	  Reichswerke,	  set	  
up	  in	  1937	  by	  Hermann	  Goering,	  grew	  into	  a	  vast	  state	  holding	  company	  in	  iron	  ore	  mining,	   iron	  and	  steel,	  and	  
armaments.	  
148	   This	   includes	   a	  minimum	   capital	   on	   formation	   of	   500,000	   Reichsmarks	   (Art.	   7);	   no	   shares	   issued	  without	   a	  
minimum	  par	  value	  of	  at	  least	  1000	  Reichsmarks	  (Arts.	  6	  and	  8);	  see	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  227-­‐228.	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greater	  publicity	  requirements	  to	  ensure	  greater	  transparency;149	  thirdly,	  it	  is	  informed	  by	  	  	  
the	  “Führerprinzip”;	  and,	   fourthly,	   it	   increases	  direct	  state	  control	  over	  the	  enterprise.150	  
The	  latter	  two	  aspects	  are	  Nazi	  innovations.	  	  
	  
The	  “Führerprinzip”	  embodies	   the	  Nazi	   ideal	  of	  personal	   leadership	   in	   the	   interest	  of	   the	  
Reich.	   Some	   experts	   argued	   that	   the	   US	   style	   unitary	   board	   was	   more	   suitable	   to	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  Führerprinzip.	  However,	  the	  final	  advice	  to	  the	  government	  was	  that	  the	  
German	  system	  remained	  better	  suited	  to	  this	  task.151	  Although	  the	  term	  is	  not	  expressly	  
used,	  by	  Art.70	  (1)	  of	  the	  1937	  Law	  the	  management	  board	  (Vorstand)	  is	  made	  the	  central	  
organ	   of	   the	   corporation	   and	   is	   tasked	  with	   the	  management	   of	   the	   corporation	   in	   the	  
interests	  of	  the	  employees,	  the	  Volk	  and	  the	  Reich.152	  The	  Führerprinzip	  is	  included	  in	  that,	  
by	  Art.70	  (2)	   the	  membership	  of	   the	  Vorstand	  can	  be	  composed	  of	  only	  one	  person.	  The	  
members	   of	   the	  Vorstand	   remain	   to	   be	   appointed	  by	   the	  Aufsichtsrat	   for	   a	   term	  of	   five	  
years	  under	  Art.75	  (1).	  This	   leaves	  the	  two-­‐tier	  board	  system	  in	  place,	  though	  the	  overall	  
direction	  of	  the	  enterprise	  is	  now	  placed	  with	  the	  Vorstand,	  not,	  as	  in	  previous	  laws,	  with	  
the	  Aufsichtsrat.	   The	  Vorstand	   continues	   to	   be	   supervised	   from	   the	   general	  meeting.153	  
Finally,	   direct	   State	   control	   is	   ensured	   by	   Art.288,	  which	   empowers	   the	   Reich	   Economic	  
Court	   (Reichswirtschaftsgericht),	   on	   application	   of	   the	   Reich	   Ministry	   for	   Economics,	   to	  
dissolve	  a	  corporation	  that	  is	  deemed	  to	  endanger	  the	  general	  welfare.	  
	  
The	   effect	   of	   the	   1937	   Law	   on	  German	   corporate	   practices	  was	   rather	   less	   far	   reaching	  
than	   its	   terms	   might	   suggest.	   Despite	   state	   controls	   over	   the	   issue	   of	   multiple	   voting	  
shares,	  this	  issuing	  practice	  continued,	  especially	  in	  companies,	  such	  as	  I.G.Farben,	  whose	  
multiple	  voting	  shares	  were	  never	  withdrawn	  by	  the	  state,	  thus	  effectively	  disenfranchising	  
                                            
149	   This	   includes	   more	   information	   about	   corporate	   members	   (Arts.	   100	   and	   128),	   more	   information	   for	  
shareholders	   (Art.	   112),	   and	  more	   details	   about	   group	   ownership	   structures	   as	  well	   as	  membership	   of	   cartels	  
(Art.128	  (8)	  and	  (9));	  See	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  231-­‐233.	  	  
150	  See	  William	  Kessler,	  The	  German	  Corporation	  Law	  of	  1937,	  28(4)	  AM.	  ECON.	  REV	  653	  (1938).	  
151	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  179-­‐181.	  
152	  By	  Art.	  70:	  “(1)	  Der	  vorstand	  hat	  unter	  eigener	  Verantwortung	  die	  Gesellschaft	  so	  zu	  leiten,	  wie	  dass	  Wohl	  des	  
Betriebes	  und	  seiner	  Gefolgschaft	  und	  der	  gemeine	  Nutzen	  von	  Volk	  und	  Reich	  es	  forderen.”	  
153	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion,	  see	  Kessler,	  supra	  note	  150,	  at	  658-­‐660;	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  228-­‐231;	  Detlev	  
Vagts,	  Reforming	  the	  "Modern"	  Corporation:	  Perspectives	  from	  the	  German,	  	  80	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  1	  23,	  41-­‐43	  (1966).	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non-­‐controlling	   shareholders.154	   Equally,	   controls	   over	   proxy	   voting	   by	   banks	   under	  
Art.114	   (4),	   which	   required	   banks	   to	   obtain	   express	   permission	   from	   shareholders	   to	  
exercise	  proxy	  votes	  on	  their	  behalf,	  were	  ineffective	  in	  preventing	  this	  practice.155	  	  
	  
The	  impact	  of	  the	  new	  relationship	  between	  the	  Vorstand	  and	  the	  Aufsichtsrat	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	   the	   first	   corporate	   reorganization	   of	   note	   after	   the	   1937	   Law,	   that	   of	   Schering	   AG.	  
Though	  formally	  the	  power	  of	  decision	  shifted	  to	  the	  Vorstand,	  its	  chair,	  Weltzien,	  retained	  
only	  one	  vote	  under	  the	  new	  corporate	  bylaws.	  This	  was	  in	  line	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  
Art.70	  (2)	  of	  the	  1937	  Law,	  which	  permitted	  a	  variation,	  under	  the	  bylaws,	  of	  the	  otherwise	  
decisive	  power	  of	   the	  chairs	  vote	   in	  cases	  where	  the	  Vorstand	  was	  divided.	  This	  ensured	  
that	   the	   chair	   of	   the	   Aufsichtsrat,	   Hans	   Berckemeyer,	   retained	   overall	   control	   as	   the	  
principal	  decision-­‐maker	  in	  the	  firm.156	  	  Thus,	  the	  “Führerprinzip”	  could	  be	  side-­‐stepped	  in	  
practice	  and	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Aufsichtsrat	  protected.	  Intriguingly,	  one	  of	  the	  only	  cases	  in	  
which	  Art.70	  of	  the	  1937	  Law	  was	  ever	  used	  by	  the	  state	  to	  try	  to	  control	  the	  decisions	  of	  a	  
company	  occurred	  in	  1962,	  when	  a	  proposed	  price	  increase	  by	  Volkswagen	  was	  challenged	  
unsuccessfully	   under	   Art.70	   by	   the	   then	   Minister	   for	   Economics,	   Ludwig	   Erhart,	   on	   the	  
grounds	  that	  this	  would	  damage	  German	  trade	  interests	  by	  making	  exports	  of	  a	  key	  export	  
commodity	  too	  high.157	  
	  
The	  main	  impact	  of	  the	  1937	  Law	  was	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  AGs	  and	  with	  it	  to	  reduce	  
activity	  on	  the	  stock	  exchanges.	  From	  a	  total	  of	  ten	  thousand	  in	  1933,	  the	  number	  of	  AGs	  
fell	  to	  five	  thousand	  in	  1939.158	  Equally,	  a	  further	  factor	  in	  the	  undermining	  of	  the	  AG	  was	  
the	  Nazi	  reorganization	  of	  the	  stock	  exchanges	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  anti-­‐capitalist	  and	  
anti-­‐Semitic	   convictions.159	   They	   replaced	   administrative	   personnel	  with	  Nazi	   supporters	  
and	  passed	  laws	  to	  shift	  control	  over	  price	  setting	  to	  official	  brokers.	  They	  banned	  Jewish	  
brokers	  from	  practice	  and	  forced	  Jewish	  shareholders	  to	  sell	  their	  stakes.	  Stock	  exchange	  
                                            
154	  See	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  214.	  
155	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  300.	  
156	  See	  Kobrak,	  supra	  note	  120,	  at	  455-­‐456.	  
157	  See	  Vagts,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  42-­‐43.	  
158	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  303.	  
159	  This	  paragraph	  is	  based	  on	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  301-­‐304.	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supervision	   was	   passed	   directly	   into	   the	   hands	   of	   central	   government,	   and	   limits	   were	  
placed	  on	  dividends	  and	  on	   foreign	  currency	  dealings,	  which	  were	  banned	  completely	   in	  
December	  1938.	  During	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  the	  stock	  exchange	  was	  turned	  into	  a	  state	  
monopoly.	   As	   the	   war	   progressed,	   the	   stock	   market	   became	   no	   more	   than	   a	   tool	   for	  
increasing	   government	   expenditure.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war,	   although	   the	   Frankfurt	   and	  
Berlin	  stock	  exchanges	  were	  still	  functioning	  (trade	  continued	  in	  Berlin	  until	  18	  April	  1945),	  
they	  were	  trading	  exclusively	  in	  Reich	  debt.	  The	  German	  stock	  market	  was	  just	  about	  dead	  
as	  a	  source	  of	  corporate	  finance.	  
	  
	  
E.	  The	  Reconstruction	  of	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  1945-­‐1990	  
	  
Although	  Germany	  was	  virtually	  destroyed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  German	  
industry	  was	  relatively	  intact.160	  However,	  the	  Allied	  occupying	  powers	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  see	  
a	  revival	  of	  war	  potential	  in	  German	  industrial	  production.161	  They	  were	  also	  concerned	  to	  
ensure	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   more	   open	  market	   economy.	   Thus,	   the	   principal	   thrust	   of	  
Allied	   corporate	   policy	   was	   to	   de-­‐concentrate	   the	   pre-­‐war	   Konzerne	   through	   anti-­‐cartel	  
laws,	   targeting	   the	   chemical	   industry,	   iron	   and	   steel,	   and	   banks,	   and	   to	   privatize	   the	  
network	  of	   state	  owned	  enterprises	  established	  during	   the	  1930s	  and	  40s.162In	  addition,	  
the	   allied	   division	   of	   Germany	   is	   a	   significant	   factor	   in	   the	   post–War	   development	   of	  
German	  corporate	  law.163	  This	  resulted	  in	  West	  Germany	  retaining	  the	  1937	  Law	  while	  the	  
German	   Democratic	   Republic	   (GDR)	   adopted	   the	   Soviet	   model	   of	   centrally	   planned	  
industrial	   organization	   and	   administration.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   GDR,	   state	   owned	   combines,	  
organized	  by	  periodic	  state	  plans,	  were	  the	  main	  characteristics	  of	  its	  industrial	  system.164	  	  
	  
                                            
160	  Id.	  at	  304.	  
161	  Id.	  
162	   Id.;	  see	  also	  Overy,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  182,	  184.	  But	  see	  the	  Volkswagen	  privatisation	  law	  which	  allowed	  the	  
State	  of	  Lower	  Saxony	  to	  retain	  control	  over	  the	  new	  firm	  through	  controlling	  a	  fifth	  of	  all	  shares.	  This	   law	  was	  
successfully	   challenged	   under	   EU	   law	   in	   2007:	   see	   Peer	   Zumbansen	  &	   Daniel	   Saam,	   The	   ECJ,	   Volkswagen	   and	  
European	  Corporate	  Law:	  Reshaping	  the	  European	  Varieties	  of	  Capitalism,	  8	  GERM.	  L.	  J.	  1026	  (2007).	  	  	  
163	  See	  further,	  MARY	  FULBROOK,	  A	  CONCISE	  HISTORY	  OF	  GERMANY	  204-­‐212(2nd	  ed.,	  2004).	  	  
164	  Id.,	  at	  235-­‐238.	  On	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  centrally	  planned	  GDR	  economy,	  see	  HANS-­‐ULRICH	  WEHLER,	  DEUTSCHE	  
GESELLSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE	  BAND	  5	  1949	  –	  1990,	  88-­‐107	  (History	  of	  German	  Society,	  Volume	  5,	  2008).	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In	  West	  Germany,	  the	  1937	  Law	  was	  in	  force	  until	  the	  reforms	  of	  1965.	  Why	  did	  it	  take	  so	  
long	  to	  remove	  this	  “Nazi	  Relic”?	  Partly,	  this	  was	  because	  the	  1937	  Law	  offered	  workable	  
corporate	   law	   rules.165	   The	  Nazi	   aspects	   of	   the	   Law	   could	   simply	   be	   ignored	   in	   practice	  
(even,	  as	  noted,	  in	  the	  Nazi	  period!)	  while	  the	  corporate	  formation,	  corporate	  governance	  
and	   shareholder	   protection	   rules	   continued	   to	   be	   of	   use,	   given	   their	   largely	   pre-­‐Nazi	  
heritage.166	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  post	  war	  reconstruction	  period	  in	  West	  Germany	  was	  
one	  of	  great	  uncertainty.	  As	  Overy	  notes,	  	  
	  
“[t]he	  defeat	  of	  the	  [Nazi]	  New	  Order,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  occupation,	  produced	  a	  
prolonged	   argument	   about	   what	   was	   to	   be	   done	   with	   German	   industry.	   The	  
restoration	   of	   a	   neo-­‐liberal	   economy	   in	   the	   1950s	   did	   not	   look	   at	   all	   certain	   in	  
1946.”167	  	  
	  
The	   Allies’	   initial	   reluctance	   to	   restore	   German	   capitalism	   was	   abandoned	   and	   they	  
encouraged	   considerable	   de-­‐regulation.168	   In	   addition,	   the	   new	   German	   political	  
settlement	  enshrined	  private	  property	  and	  personal	  freedoms	  as	  constitutional	  values.169	  
This	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  theory	  of	  Ordoliberalism	  which	  lays	  the	  intellectual	  foundations	  
of	  the	  post-­‐war	  West	  German	  “Social	  Market	  Economy”.	  	  
	  
Ordoliberalism	  advocates	   for	  a	  middle	  ground	  between	  unregulated	  corporate	  capitalism	  
and	  state	  directed	  corporatism.	  The	  regulatory	  power	  of	  the	  state	  is	  used	  to	  encourage	  the	  
development	   of	   free	  markets,	   in	   particular	   through	   competition	   laws,	   but	   it	   accepts	   the	  
public	   ownership	   of	   natural	   monopolies.	   This	   is	   coupled	   with	   safeguards	   for	   personal	  
freedom	   and	   security.170	   Worker	   co-­‐determination	   and	   shareholder	   rights	   are	   seen	   as	  
                                            
165	  See	  Vagts,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  26,	  citing	  the	  Federal	  Governments	  draft	  proposal	   for	  new	  legislation	  of	  1960,	  
Entwurf	  Eines	  Aktiengesetzes	  mit	  Begrundung	  93	  (1960).	  
166	  See	  Vagts,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  30-­‐31.	  
167	   Overy,	   supra	   note	   111,	   at	   189.	   For	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   how	  West	   Germany	   returned	   to	   a	   liberal	  market	  
economy,	  see	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  1,	  supra	  note	  11,	  Chs.	  2	  and	  3.	  	  	  	  
168	  Overy,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  189;	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  193-­‐194.	  
169	   See	   Basic	   Law	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   (Grundgesetz),	   23	  May	   1949	   Chapter	   One	   Basic	   Rights	  
(Deutscher	   Bundestag,	   Official	   English	   Translation,	   2010)	   available	   at:	   http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
170	  For	  an	  English	  summary	  of	  German	  Ordoliberal	  views	  from	  the	  period,	  see	  Carl	  Friedrich,	  The	  Political	  Thought	  
of	   Neo-­‐Liberalism,	   49	   AM.	   POL.	   SCI.	   REV.	   509	   (1965);	   Kurt	   Hanslowe,	   Neo-­‐liberalism	   an	   Analysis	   and	   Proposed	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counterbalances	  to	  the	  managerial	  control	  of	  the	  corporation.	  The	  development	  of	  SMEs	  is	  
encouraged.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   existence	   of	  Konzernen	   is	   noted,	   and	   it	   is	   accepted	  
that	   large	   enterprises	   play	   a	   socially	   useful	   role	   in	   the	   economy.	   Thus,	   they	   should	   be	  
regulated	  not	  only	  by	  competition	  law	  but	  also	  through	  corporate	  law,	  to	  ensure	  a	  better	  
balance	  between	  the	  need	  to	  manage	  the	  enterprise	  and	  to	  protect	  minority	  interests.	  It	  is	  
out	   of	   these	   concerns	   that	   the	  model	   of	   post	   war	   German	   corporate	   law	   emerges.	   The	  
main	   post	   war	   legislative	   developments	   involve	   the	   re-­‐introduction	   of	   co-­‐determination	  
laws	  and	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  1937	  Aktiengesetz	  in	  1965.	  	  
	  
Apart	   from	   the	   dual	   board	   system,	   the	   other	   conventional	   characteristic	   of	   the	   German	  
corporate	   model	   is	   the	   inclusion	   of	   worker	   representatives	   on	   the	  Aufsichtsrat,	   the	   co-­‐
determination	  system	  (Mitbestimmung).	  This	  aspect	  of	  German	  corporate	  governance	  and	  
law	  does	  not	  have	   its	   legal	   roots	   in	   the	  19th	  but	   in	   the	  early	  20th	   century.171	  Though	   the	  
idea	  of	  worker	  participation	  in	  corporate	  governance	  was	  already	  being	  debated	  in	  the	  19th	  
century,172	   it	   was	   not	   until	   the	   1920s	   that	   a	   system	   of	   worker	   participation	   was	   first	  
introduced	  by	   law.	  This	  was	  a	   response	   to	   the	  development	  of	   the	   revolutionary	   council	  
movement	   in	   the	  early	   years	   after	  World	  War	   I.	  Workers	  would	  establish	   such	  bodies	   in	  
their	  enterprises	  as	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  co-­‐operative	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  with	  
management.173	   	   The	   Works	   Councils	   Law	   (Betriebsrätegesetz)	   of	   1920	   required	   the	  
formation	  of	  works	  councils	  with	  parity	  representation	  of	  blue-­‐	  and	  white-­‐collar	  employees	  
in	  all	  establishments	  with	  over	  20	  employees.174	  The	  supplementary	  amendment	  of	  1922	  
                                                                                                                
Application,	  9	  J.	  PUB.	  L.	  96,	  97-­‐102	  (1960).	  See	  also	  RAZEEN	  SALLY,	  CLASSICAL	  LIBERALISM	  AND	  INTERNATIONAL	  ECONOMIC	  
ORDER	   (1998),	   Chapter	   6,	   “Ordoliberalism	   and	   the	   Social	   Market.”	   For	   a	   recent	   examination,	   see	   Ralf	   Ptak,	  
Neoliberalism	  in	  Germany:	  Revisiting	  the	  Ordoliberal	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Social	  Market	  Economy,	  in	  THE	  ROAD	  FROM	  
MONT	  PELERIN:	  THE	  MAKING	  OF	  THE	  NEOLIBERAL	  THOUGHT	  COLLECTIVE	  98	  (Philip	  Mirowski	  &	  Dieter	  Plehwe	  eds.,	  2009).	  In	  
German,	  see	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  1,	  supra	  note	  11,	  Chapter	  4.	  The	  main	  organ	  of	  the	  ordoliberal	  movement	  is	  the	  journal	  
Ordo:	  Jahrbuch	  fur	  die	  Ordnung	  von	  Wirtschaft	  und	  Gesellschaft	  (Yearbook	  of	  Business	  &	  Society),	  available	  online	  
at:	  http://www.ordo-­‐jahrbuch.de/en/available-­‐volumes.html (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
171	   DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	   	   supra	   note	   1,	   at	   264,	   incorrectly	   assert	   that	   “By	   1884	   corporate	   law	   reform	   led	   to	   the	  
supervisory	  board	  being	  introduced	  with	  employee	  representation	  on	  it...”	  	  
172	   See	   DU	   PLESSIS	   ET	   AL.,	   supra	   note	   10,	   at	   154-­‐155;	   Gregory	   Jackson,	   Contested	   Boundaries:	   Ambiguity	   and	  
Creativity	   in	   the	   Evolution	   of	   German	   Codetermination	   13	   (RIETI	   Discussion	   Paper	   Series	   No.	   04-­‐E-­‐022,	   2004),	  
available	   at:	   http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569541	   (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013);	  
DONNELLY	   ET.	   AL.,	   supra	   note	   111,	   at	   18-­‐21,	   discussing	   early	   forms	   of	   worker	   participation	   in	   the	   19th	   century	  
German	  coal	  industry	  and	  in	  war	  industries	  during	  World	  War	  I.	  
173	  DONNELLY	  ET.	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  21.	  On	  the	  impact	  of	  this	  policy	  on	  Schering	  AG,	  see	  Kobrak,	  supra	  note	  120,	  
at	  483.	  	  
174	  Reichsgesetzblatt	  (RGBl)	  1920	  I	  s.147;	  see	  also	  Jackson,	  supra	  note	  172.	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applied	   to	   all	   types	   of	   companies,	   not	   only	   to	   public	   limited	   companies.	   In	   companies	  
where	  the	  board	  consisted	  of	  more	  than	  three	  members	  two	  supervisory	  board	  seats	  were	  
reserved	  for	  works	  council	  members	  and	  in	  all	  other	  cases	  one	  seat	  was	  reserved	  for	  works	  
council	  members.175	  	  
	  
The	   Weimar	   era	   co-­‐determination	   laws	   were	   effectively	   abolished	   by	   the	   Nazis.	   Co-­‐
determination	   laws	   were	   re-­‐introduced,	   first	   in	   the	   iron	   and	   steel	   industry	   in	   1951	  
(Montanmitbestimmung)	   and,	   more	   generally,	   in	   1952	   (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)	   and	  
then	  revised	  in	  1976.176	  The	  Co-­‐Determination	  Act	  1976	  (Mitbestimmungsgesetz)	  stipulates	  
that,	   for	  any	  AG,	  KGaA,	  GmbH	  or	  Genossenschaft	  with	  over	  2000	  employees,	  50%	  of	   the	  
seats	   on	   the	   supervisory	   board	   will	   be	   allocated	   to	   employee	   representatives.177	   The	  
conventional	  explanation	  for	  this	  system	  is	  that	  it	  was	  introduced	  by	  the	  British	  occupation	  
authorities	   in	  conjunction	  with	  German	  trade	  unionists,	   in	  order	   to	  ensure	  class	  parity	   in	  
German	   enterprises	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   preventing	   any	   resurgence	   of	   the	   dictatorial	  
tendencies	   of	   the	   Third	   Reich.178	   However,	   as	   noted	   above,	   the	   concept	   of	   worker	  
participation	  enterprises	  has	  been	  present	  in	  German	  legal	  thought	  since	  at	  least	  the	  early	  
1920s,	   if	   not	   earlier,	   and	   so	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   restoration	   of	   certain	   themes	   from	   this	  
historical	  discourse	  into	  the	  social	  market	  economy	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  years.	  	  
	  
The	  main	  impact	  of	  co-­‐determination	  on	  corporate	  law	  has	  been	  to	  entrench	  the	  two-­‐tier	  
board	  structure	  in	  undertakings	  that	  qualify	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  labour	  representatives	  by	  
reason	  of	  their	  size.	  Thus,	  in	  1980,	  a	  commission	  of	  the	  Federal	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  on	  the	  
reform	  of	   the	   law	  of	   business	   associations	   expressly	   ruled	  out	   the	   adoption	  of	   a	   unitary	  
                                            
175	  GESETZ	  UBER	  DIE	  ENTSENDUNG	  VON	  BETRIEBSRATMITGLIEDERN	  IN	  DEN	  AUFSICHTSRAT	  VOM	  15	  FEBRUAR	  1922,	  15	  Feb.	  1992,	  
REICHSGESETZBLATT	   (RGBL)	  1922	   I	  No.	  17	  pp.	  209/10	  (Ger.).	  See	  DU	  PLESSIS	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  154.	  Levy	   feels	  
these	  laws	  were	  ineffective:	  see	  LEVY,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  172.	  
176	  See	  DONNELLY	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  111,	  at	  22-­‐23;	  Vagts,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  64-­‐89;	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  219-­‐
224;	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  1,	  	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  Chapter	  6.	  For	  the	  leading	  historical	  treatise	  on	  co-­‐determination,	  see	  HANS	  
TEUTENBERG,	   GESCHICHTE	   DER	   INDUSTRIELLEN	  MITBESTIMMUNG	   IN	   DEUTSCHLAND	   (History	   of	   Industrial	   Co-­‐Determination	  
in	  Germany,	  1961).	  	  
177	  MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ	  VOM	  4.	  MAI	  1976,	  4	  May	  1976,	  BGBL.	   I	  S.	  1153,	  Arts.	  1,	  7;	  German	  version	  available	  at:	  
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/mitbestg/gesamt.pdf (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   For	   analysis	   of	  
the	  background	  to	  the	  1976	  reforms,	  see	  Heinz	  Hartmann,	  Codetermination	  Today	  and	  Tomorrow,	  13(1)	  BRIT.	   	  J.	  
IND.	  REL.	  54	  (1975);	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  2,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  Chapter	  6.	  
178	  DU	  PLESSIS	  ET	  AL.,	  supra	  note	  10,	  at	  155.	  See	  also	  Herbert	  Spero,	  Co-­‐Determination	  in	  Germany,	  48	  AM.	  POL.	  SCI.	  
REV.	  1114	  (1954).	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board	   system	   for	   Germany	   as	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	   legal	   implications	   for	   the	   co-­‐
determination	  process.179	  	  
	  
The	   main	   aim	   of	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   Aktiengesetz	   in	   1965	   was	   to	   restore	   the	   efficient	  
operation	   of	   a	   stock	   market	   and	   to	   encourage	   corporate	   finance	   through	   the	   issue	   of	  
tradable	  shares,	  and	  to	  discourage	  the	  financing	  of	  business	  through	  re-­‐investment	  of	  own	  
capital.180	  Thereby,	  the	  allocative	  efficiency	  of	  capital	  markets	  could	  be	  restored.181	  Other	  
aims	   included	   improving	   the	   lot	   of	   small	   shareholders,	   restoring	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	  
Aufsichtsrat	  over	  the	  Vorstand,	  and	  to	  regulate	  the	  affairs	  of	  large	  corporate	  groups,	  so	  as	  
to	   promote	   their	   business	   utility	   while	   balancing	   this	   against	   the	   protection	   of	  minority	  
shareholders.	   The	   resulting	   major	   innovation	   was	   the	   development	   of	   comprehensive	  
corporate	   group	   regulation	  which	  was	   internationally	   unprecedented	   at	   the	   time.182	   	   In	  
addition,	   the	   1965	   Law	   once	   again	   tackled	   the	   issue	   of	   proxy	   voting	   by	   banks.	   As	   with	  
previous	  laws,	  banks	  were	  obliged	  to	  obtain	  written	  authorization	  to	  cast	  such	  votes.	  This	  
authorization	  would	  be	  valid	  for	  up	  to	  fifteen	  months	  and	  could	  be	  given	  for	  all	  or	  part	  of	  
the	  customer	  shareholder’s	  portfolio.	  The	  bank	  had	  to	  give	  the	  customer	  the	  opportunity	  
to	  direct	  how	  the	  vote	  would	  be	  cast,	  and	  to	  inform	  how	  the	  bank	  intended	  to	  vote.	  In	  the	  
absence	  of	  instructions	  the	  bank	  could	  vote	  as	  it	  wished.183	  
	  
                                            
179	  UNTERNEHMENSRECHTSKOMMISSION	  177	   (Corporate	  Law	  Commission,	  1980),	  cited	  by	  VON	  HIEN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  
224.	  	  
180	   AKTIENGESETZ	   VOM	   6	   SEPTEMBER	   1965,	   6	   Sep.	   1965,	   BGBl	   I,	   s.	   1089,	   available	   at: http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐
internet.de/bundesrecht/aktg/gesamt.pdf	   (Ger.)(last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   For	   comparative	   analysis,	   see	  
ANDENAS	  &	  WOOLDRIDGE,	  supra	  note	  10.	  For	  a	  recent	  account	  of	  the	  current	  law,	  see	  TIM	  DRYGALA,	  MARKO	  STAAKE	  &	  
STEPHAN	  SZALAI,	  KAPITALGESELLSCHAFTRECHT	  (2012).	  See	  also	  Vagts,	  supra	  note	  153,	  at	  27;	  and,	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  
of	  the	  debates	  leading	  to	  the	  1965	  Law,	  see	  Nörr,	  TEIL	  1,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  201-­‐214	  and	  Chapter	  9.	  See	  also	  HEINZ-­‐
UWE	  DETTLING,	  DIE	  ENTSTEHUNGSGESCHICHTE	  DES	  KONZERNRECHTS	  IM	  AKTIENGESETZ	  VON	  1965	  (1997).	  
181	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  195-­‐196.	  
182	  See	  AKTIENGESETZ	  VOM	  6	  SEPTEMBER	  1965,	  supra	  note	  180,	  Arts.	  17-­‐18,	  291-­‐323;	  see	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  1,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  
253-­‐256.	  In	  1985,	  these	  rules	  were	  extended	  by	  the	  Federal	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  GmbH	  based	  groups	  in	  the	  Autokran	  
judgment:	  see	  NÖRR,	  TEIL	  2,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  257-­‐258.	  For	  a	  more	  recent	  analysis,	  see	  Rene	  Reich-­‐Graefe,	  Changing	  
Paradigms:	  The	  Liability	  of	  Corporate	  Groups	  in	  Germany,	  	  37	  CONN.	  L.	  R.	  785	  (2005).	  
183	  See	  AKTIENGESETZ	  VOM	  6	  SEPTEMBER	  1965,	  supra	  note	  180,	  Arts.	  128,	  135.	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The	  reforms	  of	  1965	  did	  not	  challenge	  the	  post-­‐war	  concentration	  of	  German	  industry	  or	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  banks.184	  This	  was	  the	  result	  of	  a	  decline	  in	  household	  shareholding	  and	  
continued	   concentration	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   family	   owners	   and	   inter-­‐firm	  block	   holdings.185	  
The	  corporate	  group	  laws	  merely	  regulated	  the	  losses	  to	  minority	  shareholders	  arising	  out	  
of	  decisions	  taken	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole.186	  The	  block	  holding	  of	  shares	  
continued	  until	   the	  reforms	  of	   the	  1990s.187	  Equally,	   the	  rules	  on	  proxy	  voting	  could	  not	  
stop	   the	  banks	   from	  wielding	   their	  power	  as	  most	   customers	  would	  not	  direct	  how	  they	  
should	  vote.188	  This	  led	  to	  further	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s.189	  	  	  
	  
The	  final	  part	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  of	  corporate	  law	  involves	  the	  reunification	  of	  
Germany	   in	   1990.	   By	   Art.8	   of	   the	   Unification	   Treaty	   of	   31	   August,	   West	   German	   law	  
entered	   force	   on	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   former	   GDR	   and	   so	   West	   German	   corporate	   law	  
became	   the	   governing	   law	   for	   all	   Germany.190	   This	  meant	   that	   economic	   entities	   of	   the	  
GDR	  would	  have	  to	  change	  from	  state	  to	  private	  ownership.	  Given	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  
privately	  owned	  enterprises	  in	  the	  GDR	  since	  1972,	  economic	  entities	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  
come	  within	   the	   provisions	   of	   existing	   corporate	   law.191	   	   Accordingly,	   their	   assets	  were	  
                                            
184	  For	  evidence	  of	  levels	  of	  concentration	  and	  bank	  control	  in	  late	  20th	  century	  Germany,	  see	  Jeremy	  Edwards	  &	  
Markus	   Nibbler,	   Corporate	   Governance:	   Banks	   Versus	   Concentration	   in	   Germany,	   15	   ECONOMIC	   POLICY	   No.	   31	  
(2000),	   available	   at:	    http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=247410 (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	  
2013);	  Ekkehart	  Boehmer,	  Who	  Controls	  German	  Corporations?,	   in	  CORPORATE	  GOVERNANCE	  REGIMES:	  CONVERGENCE	  
AND	  DIVERSITY	   268	   (Joseph	  McCahery,	   Piet	  Moerland,	   Theo	   Raaijmakers	  &	   Luc	   Renneboog	   eds.,	   2002);	   see	   also	  
Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  231-­‐237.	  
185	  See	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  231-­‐237.	  	  
186	  Further,	  see	  Muchlinski,	  supra	  note	  104,	  at	  329-­‐330.	  
187	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  196.	  
188	  See	  FOHLIN,	  supra	  note	  78,	  at	  314.	  
189	  On	  which,	  see	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76,	  at	  218-­‐248;	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  267-­‐268.	  
190	  Unification	  Treaty,	  August	  31,	  1990,	  Aug.	  31,	  1990,	  GB1.	  (GDR)	  I,	  s.	  1629;	  BGB1.	  (FRG)	  II,	  s.	  889,	  available	  at:	  
http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-­‐dc.org/pdf/eng/Unification_Treaty.pdf (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013).	  
191	  See	   further	   Johannes	  Wasmuth,	   The	  Reunification	  Treaty	  between	   the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	   the	  
German	  Democratic	  Republic	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  commercial,	  company	  and	  bankruptcy	  law,	  1991	  INT’L	  BUS.	  L.	  J.	  765	  
2013]	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transferred	   to	   the	   Treuhand,	   the	   public	   legal	   entity	   which,	   by	   Art.25	   of	   the	   Unification	  
Treaty,	  “shall	  continue	  to	  be	  charged,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Trusteeship	  
Act	   [Treuhandgesetz],	   with	   restructuring	   and	   privatizing	   the	   former	   publicly	   owned	  
enterprises	  to	  bring	  them	  into	   line	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  competitive	  economy.”192	  
By	   Art.11	   of	   the	   Treuhand	   Law,	   all	   former	   GDR	   enterprises	   were	   converted	   into	   capital	  
stock	   corporations	   (Kapitalgesellschaften)	   and	   remained	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	  
Treuhandanstalt,	  the	  body	  established	  under	  Art.2	  of	  the	  Treuhand	  Law,	  to	  undertake	  the	  
privatization	   process.	   The	   enterprises	   that	   were	   not	   yet	   privatized	   would	   be	   regulated	  
according	  to	  the	  rules	  set	  out	  in	  Arts.16	  to	  23	  of	  this	  law.193	  
	  
	  
F.	  Concluding	  Remarks:	  Globalization,	  Comparison	  and	  German	  Corporate	  Law	  	  
	  
Since	  1990,	  German	  corporate	  law	  has	  undergone	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  aimed	  at	  creating	  a	  
more	   shareholder	   oriented	   system	   of	   corporate	   law.	   In	   particular,	   laws	   on	   control	   and	  
transparency	  of	  corporations	  and	  on	  registration	  and	  facilitation	  of	  voting	  rights	  sought	  to	  
offer	  more	   information	   to	   shareholders	  and	   to	   revisit	   the	  need	   to	   regulate	  proxy	  voting.	  
Banks	  must	   now	   separate	   their	   voting	   plan	   division	   form	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   bank	   and	  must	  
offer	   greater	   disclosure	   as	   to	   their	   voting	   intentions.194	   This	   coincides	   with	   the	   gradual	  
withdrawal	  of	  banks	  as	  shareholders	  in	  non-­‐financial	  corporations.195	  In	  addition,	  in	  2002,	  
the	   Government	   Commission	   appointed	   by	   Justice	  Minister	   in	   September	   2001	   adopted	  
the	   German	   Corporate	   Governance	   Code,	   which	   forms	   the	   basis	   of	   current	   corporate	  
                                                                                                                
(1991),	   who	   lists	   the	   following	   types	   of	   entities:	   “volkseigene	   Kombinate”	   (peoples'	   combines),	  
“Kombinatsbetriebe”(combine	  enterprises)	  and	  “volkseigene	  Betriebe”	  (peoples'	  enterprises).	  
192	   TREUHANDGESETZ	   VOM	   17	   JUNI	   1990	   (Trust	   Law),	   17	   June	   1990,	   GBl.	   (GDR)	   I,	   s.	   300,	   available	   at: 
http://www.gesetze-­‐im-­‐internet.de/bundesrecht/treuhg/gesamt.pdf	   (Ger.)(last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   The	  
handling	   of	   privatization	   by	   the	   Treuhand	   has	   been	   controversial:	   see	   Wendy	   Carlin,	   Privatization	   in	   East	  
Germany,	  1990-­‐92,	  10(3)	  GERM.	  HIST.	  335	  (1992);	  Joerg	  Roesler,	  Privatisation	  Alone	  Cannot	  Solve	  East	  Germany’s	  
Economic	  Problems:	  Reflections	  on	  Wendy	  Carlin’s	  Article	   ‘Privatisation	   in	  East	  Germany	  1990-­‐92’,	  12(1)	   	  GERM.	  
HIST.	   64	   	   (1994);	   Wendy	   Carlin,	  Wages,	   Privatization	   and	   Industrial	   Collapse:	   A	   Reply	   to	   Jorg	   Roesler’s	   reply	  
‘Privatization	  alone	  cannot	  solve	  east	  Germany’s	  economic	  problems’	  (German	  History	  12/1	  (1994)),	  12(2)	  GERM.	  
HIST.	  190	  (1994).	  
193	  For	  the	  legal	  forms	  of	  enterprises	  in	  transformation,	  see	  Michael	  Gruson	  &	  Georg	  F.	  Thoma,	  Investments	  In	  The	  
Territory	  Of	  The	  Former	  German	  Democratic	  Republic,	  14(3)	  FORDHAM	  INT’L	  L.	  J.	  540,	  545-­‐552	  (1990).	  
194	  Fohlin,	  supra	  note	  101,	  at	  267.	  
195	  See	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  362-­‐371.	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disclosure	   law.196	   Equally,	   the	   impact	   of	   EU	   law	   has	   resulted	   in	   new	   rules	   on	   corporate	  
residence	   in	   light	   of	   the	  Centos	   Case	   in	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice,	   allowing	  German	  
corporations	   to	   incorporate	   outside	   Germany	   without	   loss	   of	   their	   legal	   rights,	   and	   the	  
introduction	  of	  a	  new	  supranational	   corporate	   form	  the	  Societas	  Europea	   (SE)	  which	  has	  
been	  taken	  up	  by	  German	  corporations	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  European	  expansion.197	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	  the	  takeover	  in	  2000	  of	  Mannesmann	  by	  Vodafone	  gave	  credence	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	   a	  market	   for	   corporate	   control	  was	   finally	   emerging	   in	   Germany.198	  Moreover,	   the	  
system	  of	  co-­‐determination	  is	  being	  challenged	  as	  a	  brake	  on	  enhancement	  of	  shareholder	  
value,	  though	  it	  remains	  a	  significant	  feature	  of	  the	  German	  industrial	  landscape.199	  These	  
changes	  can	  all	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reply	  to	  the	  challenge	  of	  globalization.	  	  
	  
Whether	  this	  represents	  evidence	  of	  convergence	  between	  German	  corporate	  law	  and	  the	  
shareholder	   oriented	   Anglo-­‐American	   system	   remains	   open	   to	   debate.200	   The	   larger	  
question	   is	   whether	   such	   an	   issue	   is	   any	   longer	   relevant.	   A	   new	   wave	   of	   corporate	  
governance	  history	  has	  emerged,	  on	  whose	  methodology	  the	  paper	  relies,	  which	   is	  more	  
firmly	  rooted	  in	  archival	  research,	  and	  is	  skeptical	  of	  arguments	  based	  on	  path	  dependency	  
and	   the	   neo-­‐liberal	   tendency	   to	   value	   market-­‐based	   relationships	   over	   co-­‐ordinated	  
                                            
196	   This	   is	   achieved	   through	   the	   declaration	   of	   conformity	   pursuant	   to	  Article	   161	   of	   the	  AKTIENGESETZ	   1965,	   as	  
amended	  by	  Art.1	  (16)	  of	  the	  TRANSPARENCY	  AND	  DISCLOSURE	  LAW,	  19	  July	  2002,	  BGBl	  	  2002	  I,	  Nr.	  50	  s.	  2681,	  available	  
at:	   http://www.bgbl.de/Xaver/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013),	   which	  
entered	   into	  force	  on	  26	  July	  2002.	  See	  THE	  GERMAN	  CORPORATE	  GOVERNANCE	  CODE,	  as	  amended	  on	  15	  May	  2012,	  
available	   at:	   http://www.corporate-­‐governance-­‐
code.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf (last	   accessed:	   1	   February	   2013).	   See	   also	  
DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  342-­‐343.	  	  
197	  Case	  C-­‐212/97,	  Centros	  Ltd	  v.	  Erhvervs-­‐OG	  Selskabsstyrelsen,	  1999	  2	  C.M.L.R.	  551;	  see	  also	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  
supa	  note	  1,	  at	  315-­‐319.	  
198	  Martin	  Höpner	  &	  Gregory	  Jackson	  An	  Emerging	  Market	  for	  Corporate	  Control?	  The	  Mannesmann	  Takeover	  and	  
German	   Corporate	   Governance,	   Discussion	   Paper	   01/4	   (2001),	   available	   at: http://www.mpi-­‐fg-­‐
koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp01-­‐4.pdf (last	  accessed:	  1	  February	  2013);	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  371-­‐
378.	  
199	  See	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  319-­‐322;	  Jackson,	  supra	  note	  172.	  	  
200	  For	  the	  extensive	  discussion	  by	  Dignam	  and	  Galanis,	  who	  see	  a	  degree	  of	  convergence	  but	  also	  consider	  that	  
the	   insider	  model	  of	  German	   law	  has	  on	  the	  whole	  endured	  and	  could	  resurface	  as	  a	  superior	   response	  to	   the	  
impact	  of	  global	  economic	  crisis,	  see	  DIGNAM	  &	  GALANIS,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  409-­‐419.	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arrangements.201	   Rather,	   it	   seeks	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   ’insider/outsider’	   dichotomy	   and	   to	  
show	  that	  corporate	   law	  and	  governance	  systems	  do	  not	   fall	  neatly	   into	  either	  category,	  
either	  over	   time	  or	  at	  any	  particular	   time,	  and	  that	  hybrid	  characteristics	  of	  each	  system	  
can	   co-­‐exist	   at	   any	   one	   time	   in	   any	   system,	   and	   that	   the	   limited	   liability	   joint	   stock	  
corporation	   is	   not	   the	   only	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   enterprise	   governance	   that	   has	  
historically	  allowed	  for	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  solutions.202	  In	  this	  light,	  a	  number	  of	  lessons	  arise	  
out	  of	  this	  historical	  excursus	  which	  should	  inform	  legal	  debate	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  German	  
corporate	  law.	  	  
	  
The	   first	   is	   that	  German	  corporate	   law	  developed	  during	   the	  19th	   century	  along	  more	  or	  
less	  similar	   lines	  to	  the	  other	  European	  origin	  systems	  based	  on	  the	  need	  for	  capital	  and	  
under	   the	   influence	   of	   economic	   liberalism.	   Comparative	   legal	   thought	   was	   highly	  
influential	  in	  this	  process.	  Thus,	  the	  German	  system	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  can	  be	  seen	  not	  as	  
an	   alternative	   to,	   but	   as	   a	   variant	   of,	   a	   common	   core	   of	   corporate	   law	   principles,	  
originating	  in	  the	  French	  Code	  de	  Commerce	  and	  in	  English	  law,	  which	  played	  a	  formative	  
role	  in	  German	  legal	  thought.	  Unsurprisingly,	  quite	  similar	  basic	  elements	  of	  corporate	  law	  
emerged	  in	  earlier	  German	  laws,	  and	  in	  the	  reforms	  of	  1870	  and	  1884,	  as	  in	  England	  and	  
France	  at	  the	  time.	  The	  key	  result	  of	  the	  reforms	  of	  1870	  and	  1884	  was	  the	  replacement	  of	  
the	  concession	  system	  by	  freedom	  of	  incorporation	  through	  registration,	  albeit	  with	  more	  
demanding	  minimum	  capital	  and	  transparency	  requirements.	  	  
	  
Second,	   the	   dual	   board	   system	   appears	   overemphasized	   as	   a	   significant	   differentiating	  
factor.	  It	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  mandatory	  requirement	  in	  the	  1870	  reforms,	  and	  reinforced	  
in	  1884,	  due	  to	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  Hanseatic	  Cities’	  desire	  for	  complete	  corporate	  
freedom	  and	  Prussian	   concern	  over	   loss	  of	   state	   control	  over	   corporations,	   and	  not	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  some	  inherent	  quality	  in	  German	  corporate	  law.	  After	  all,	  the	  Prussian	  law	  of	  1843	  
had	   a	   unitary	   board	   under	   the	   concession	   system.	   In	   addition,	   the	   alleged	   causal	  
relationship	  between	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  dual	  board	  system	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  bank	  
dominance	  over	  German	  industry	  must	  be	  treated	  with	  caution.	  As	  noted	  in	  section	  2,	  the	  
role	   of	   the	   banks	   as	   a	   controlling	   influence	   over	   corporate	   policy	   and	   increasing	  
concentration	  is	  at	  least	  open	  to	  historical	  doubt.	  Nor	  is	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  banks	  wanted	  this.	  
Indeed,	  Georg	  Siemens,	   the	  head	  of	   the	  management	  board	  of	  Deutsche	  Bank	  (a	   leading	  
example	   in	   the	   bank	   domination	   thesis)	   in	   the	   1870s,	   expressed	   dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  
dual	  board	   structure.203	  Furthermore,	   the	  ability	  of	   the	  Aufsichtsrat	   to	  control	  dominant	  
                                            
201	  See	  the	  papers	  by	  Herrigel,	  supra	  note	  9,	  the	  special	  issue	  of	  Enterprise	  and	  Society	  (Vol.8(3),	  2007),	  and	  -­‐	  on	  
Germany	  -­‐	  the	  work	  of	  Fohlin	  cited	  in	  the	  paper.	  
202	  See	  Herrigel,	  supra	  note	  9,	  at	  481-­‐482.	  
203	  See	  Franks	  et.	  al.,	  supra	  note	  57,	  at	  4	  note	  3,	  citing	  the	  criticism	  of	  the	  supervisory	  board	  by	  Georg	  Siemens.	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managers	  has	  been	  repeatedly	  doubted	  in	  Germany,	  especially	  after	  economic	  crashes	  and	  
scandals.	   In	  practice,	   the	  German	  corporation,	  as	  much	  as	   the	  US	  or	  English	  corporation,	  
has	  become	  subject	  to	  the	  centralized	  control	  of	  key	  managers	  and	  the	  agency	  problem	  is	  
similar.	  A	   further	  element	   is	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  GmbH,	  which	  envisages	  a	  unitary	  board	  
structure.	   It	   is	  not	  until	   the	  advent	  of	   the	  post	  World	  War	   II	   system	  of	   co-­‐determination	  
that	   the	   larger	   GmbHs	   had	   to	   adopt	   the	   dual	   board	   system	   to	   accommodate	   worker	  
representatives.	   Many	   GmbHs	   remain	   unitary	   board	   firms.	   Given	   their	   numerical	  
importance	   in	   German	   corporate	   history	   this	   should	   not	   be	   overlooked	   in	   future	  
comparative	  corporate	  law	  study.	  	  
	  
Third,	   the	   issue	   of	   shareholder	   protection	   was	   addressed	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   more	  
comprehensively	   than	   in	   other	   capitalist	   economies	   of	   the	   period.	   Despite	   continuing	  
debates	  on	  the	  issue,	  the	  German	  Kaiserreich	  of	  the	  1870s	  and	  1880s	  can	  be	  seen,	  in	  this	  
respect,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  its	  espousal	  of	  freedom	  of	  incorporation,	  as	  a	  facilitative	  state	  
which	  helped	  to	  develop	  German	  securities	  markets,	  not	  as	  an	  anti-­‐liberal	   interventionist	  
state,	  despite	  its	  dominance	  by	  conservative	  Prussian	  landed	  interests.204	  Concern	  for	  the	  
small	  shareholder	  continued	  into	  the	  Weimar	  Republic	  when	  new	  standards	  of	  corporate	  
disclosure	  were	   introduced	   in	  1931.	  The	  gradual	  destruction	  of	   the	  stock	  market	  by	  Nazi	  
intervention,	   which	   in	   effect	   denied	   post-­‐war	   Germany	   access	   to	   a	   domestic	   securities	  
market	  for	  its	  reconstruction	  and	  led	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  concentrated	  block-­‐holdings,	  is	  a	  more	  
likely	   cause	   of	   the	   apparent	   loss	   of	   strong	   shareholder	   protection	   in	   German	   law.	   Even	  
then	  the	  1937	  law	  retained	  many	  protections	  put	  in	  place	  by	  the	  1931	  reforms	  and	  added	  
further	  ones,	  especially	  against	  multiple	  voting	  shares	  and	  proxy	  voting.	  	  
	  
After	  World	  War	  II,	  a	  major	  policy	  aim	  was	  to	  rectify	  the	  shareholder	  protection	  problem.	  
That	   reform	   was	   not	   really	   successful	   until	   the	   1990s.	   This	   reflects	   the	   inability	   of	   the	  
political	  order	   to	  affect	   the	  entrenchment	  of	  post-­‐war	  block-­‐holding	  managerial	   interests	  
until	   the	  onset	  of	  globalization	  and	   the	   reorientation	  of	  German	  business	   strategies.	   It	   is	  
also	   a	   result	   of	   shifting	   ideas	   within	   the	   German	   legal	   profession,	   which	   increasingly	  
advocates	   a	   liberal	   shareholder	   oriented	   model	   of	   the	   corporation	   and	   is	   a	   driver	   of	  
reform.205	   Furthermore,	   reforms	   in	   German	   accounting	   practice,	   related	   in	   part	   to	   the	  
                                            
204	  On	  which,	  see	  Fulbrook,	  supra	  note	  163,	  at	  137-­‐144,	  who	  believes	  that	  the	  state	  was	   intervening	   in	   industry	  
but	  does	  not	  document	  the	  point.	  The	  more	  convincing	  position	  is	  given	  by	  VON	  HEIN,	  supra	  note	  76	  as	  discussed	  
in	  supra	  note	  111,	  Mann,	  supra	  note	  111,	  and	  Overy,	  supra	  note	  111.	  	  
205	  See	  Philipp	  Klages,	  The	  contractual	  turn:	  How	  legal	  experts	  shaped	  corporate	  governance	  reforms	  in	  Germany,	  
1	  SOCIO-­‐ECONOMIC	  REVIEW	  ADVANCE	  ACCESS	  (2012).	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adoption	   of	   International	   Accounting	   Standards	   for	   all	   publicly	   listed	   corporations	   under	  
the	  European	  IAS	  Regulation	  EC	  No.1606/2002,	  have	  assisted	  in	  this	  process.206	  
	  
Finally,	   co-­‐determination,	   in	   its	   current	   form	   a	   product	   of	   recent	   times,	   has	   a	   stronger	  
claim	   to	   be	   the	   truly	   distinctive	   feature	   of	   the	  German	   system.	   This	   institution,	   and	   the	  
political	   compromise	   that	   it	   represents,	   is	   keeping	   the	   German	   corporate	   structure	   in	  
place,	   rather	   than	   any	   ’legal	   family’	   factor.	   It	   is	   certainly	   not	   a	   civil	   law	   issue,	   as	   co-­‐
determination	   could	   be	   adopted	   in	   a	   common	   law	   jurisdiction.	   Nor	   is	   it	   fair	   to	   call	   this	  
national	   political	   compromise	   an	   ’insider’	   response:	   it	   is	   too	  much	   a	   part	   of	   the	   present	  
German	   social	   order	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   type	   of	   corporate	   interest.	   It	   is	   not	   really	   even	  
corporate	  law	  (any	  functional	  comparison	  would	  render	  it	  apiece	  with	  labour	  law	  in	  Anglo-­‐
American	  thought)	  but	  a	  public	  law	  based	  system	  of	  control	  over	  class	  conflict	  that	  affects	  
corporate	   governance.	   Should	   co-­‐determination	   fall,	   the	   consequences	   for	   the	  
development	   of	   German	   corporate	   law	  would	   be	   far	   reaching,	   possibly	   even	   ending	   the	  
dual	  board	  system?	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  See	  Eva	  Heidhues	  &	  Chris	  Patel,	  A	  critique	  of	  Gray’s	  framework	  on	  accounting	  values	  using	  Germany	  as	  a	  case	  
study,	  22	  CRITICAL	  PERSPECTIVES	  ON	  ACCOUNTING	  273,	  281	  (2011).	  
